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THE EVOLUTION OF STATE SUPREME 
COURTS 
Robert A. Kagan* 
Bliss Cartwright** 
Lawrence M Friedman*** 
Stanton Wheeler**** t 
The past century has seen a striking variation in the size of state 
supreme courts' caseloads-the number of appeals they hear and 
opinions they write. Some courts1 issued 500 opinions or more in a 
single year; others wrote fewer than 100. A single court's caseload 
sometimes doubled from one decade to the next and then declined 
again. This Article reports the findings of our research on how 
caseload size affected the structure and business of American state 
supreme courts from 1870 to 1970.2 These findings derive from a 
study of state supreme courts, as revealed by selected quantitative 
measures. We have asked: How many cases did these courts decide? 
And what kinds? What types of litigants did they serve? How did 
their work change over the years? How did it differ from state to 
state? What do the changes suggest about the direction of state 
supreme court development and about the causal links between so-
cial conditions and legal change? 
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2. Other findings from this research project have been published in Kagan, Cartwright, 
Friedman, & Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121 
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By arranging and rearranging our information on fluctuating 
supreme court caseloads, and comparing it with other quantitative 
measures of court performance, such as dissent rates, length of opin-
ions, and types of issues decided, we discerned a rough pattern of 
evolution: as a state's population grew, its supreme court's caseload 
(measured by published opinions) usually grew along with it, some-
times quite dramatically. The increase in caseload naturally evoked 
efforts to reorganize the judiciary system to relieve the pressure on 
the court. Eventually, states with heavy caseloads introduced struc-
tural reforms, principally intermediate appellate courts, and in-
creased the supreme court's control over its docket. These changes, 
moreover, seemed to affect the supreme courts' legal role, for they 
coincided with changes in the type of case heard, the way courts 
made decisions, and the results of cases. 
The relationships are neither perfect nor exact. The supreme 
courts of the different states developed in the same direction. But 
they have not moved in lockstep through fixed stages of develop-
ment. Court reform, always a complex process, was uniquely shaped 
in every state by intensely local political battles. Still, our quantita-
tive measures show long-term trends in court reorganization that 
tend to override the purely local and idiosyncratic developments of 
particular states. 
Until recently, few states published statistics on the work of their 
supreme courts, so our study has had to rely on primary data~the 
shelves upon shelves of volumes of published opinions. It would 
have been far too arduous and expensive to deal with all of this data. 
Instead we drew samples, and, in gathering data, concentrated ofi 
those aspects of cases which could most easily be reduced to a 
number, a code, or a formula. 
Our sample consisted of sixteen states, one-third of the total in 
the nation if we exclude Hawaii and Alaska, which became states 
only toward the end of our hundred-year period. To pick these six-
teen, we divided the forty-eight states into clusters of states that 
were, for most of those hundred years, most alike in population, in-
dustrialization, urbanization, per capita income, racial composition, 
legislative innovativeness, and other measures likely to affect the le .. 
gal business of the state court system. 3 One cluster that emerged was 
3. Measures taken from census data were assembled by Richard Hofferbert and made 
available through The University of Michigan Consortium. Hofferbert, Socio-Economic 
.Dimensions of the American States: 1890-1960, 12 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 401 (1968). The men• 
sure of legislative innovativeness was developed by Jack Walker. Walker, The .D!/fusion of 
Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 880 (1969). 
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made up of Plains states, such as Kansas, Nebraska, and the 
Dakotas; another consisted of urban, industrialized states. A third 
cluster included the Southern states; the Rocky Mountain states 
formed another distinct group. From each cluster we selected states 
randomly, in numbers proportionate to the size of the cluster. The 
sixteen chosen are (alphabetically): Alabama, California, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee 
and West Virginia. · 
We counted all the opinions of at least one page in length issued 
by the supreme court of each. of these states in twenty-one sample 
years-1870, 1875, 1880, and so on through 1970.4 From the opin-
ions in each sample year, we drew a random sample of eighteen 
cases, producing a total of roughly 6,000.5 One member of a team of 
ten law students then read each case, recording its procedural his-
tory, the nature of the parties, and the area of law which underlay 
tµe plaintiff's claim. The reader further noted any constitutional is-
sues, the court's decision, the presence of concurring or dissenting 
opinions, the length of the opinion, the number and type of authori-
ties cited, and how often the case was subsequently cited in Shepard's 
Citations. Twenty percent of the sampled cases were coded twice; 
hundreds more were reread and recoded when computer editing rou-
tines signalled that some coding error was likely. We believe the 
result is a representative sample of cases, reliably coded. 6 
Part I of this Article describes in broad quantitative terms the 
changing relationship between the caseload of supreme courts and 
the population of the states in which these courts sit. Part II exam-
ines the various means states used to control supreme court 
caseloads, the political problems involved, and the types of courts 
4. In addition to very short memorandum opinions, we excluded from our caseload totals 
opinions on rehearing and opinions denying motions for rehearing. We also excluded, neces-
sarily, decisions issued without opinion (or without published opinion) and decisions granting 
or denying petitions for review. Consequently, our discussion of "caseload" in fact refers to 
"opinion load"; "caseload" is not a measure of the courts' ''workload." Our study, in effect, 
involves cases decided with full opinion, cases treated as significant by the supreme courts 
themselves. 
5. Our target was a sample of 6,000 cases (budget and time prevented anything much 
larger), which worked out to 18 cases from each of 21 sample years for 16 states. The actual 
sample turned out to be 5,904 cases because Idaho and South Dakota did not become states 
until 1890, and thus we had only 17 sample years for those courts. For the most part, we 
analyze and present the data in three time periods: 1870-1900, 1905-1935, and 1940-1970. In 
this form, the relevant sample size is 126 cases per state and 2,016 for the 16 states for the last 
two time periods. It is 1,872 for the first period. 
6. For a more complete description of our sampling, coding, and analyzing procedures, see 
Cartwright, Conclusion: .Disputes and Reported Cases, 9 LAW & Socv. REV. 369 (1975); Kagan, 
· Cartwright, Friedman, & Wheeler, supra note 2. 
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that have resulted. Part III presents evidence that changes in court 
organization in response to caseload pressure are accompanied by 
changes in the kinds of cases state supreme courts hear, the style of 
their opinions, and the results of the cases. 
I. THE CHANGING CASELOADS OF STATE SUPREME COURTS 
The population of the sixteen states in our sample increased 
steadily over time, from fewer than eleven million in 1870 to over 
seventy-three million in 1970. The sixteen supreme courts issued an 
average of 131 opinions in 1870, or 170.8 opinions per million per-
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TABLE I 
THE EFFECT OF POPULATION SIZE ON OPINION CASELOADS 
1870- 1885- 1900- 1915- 1930- 1945- 1960-
1880 1895 1910 1925 1940 1955 1970 
The Effect on 
Average Opinions 
Per State 
Correlation (r) .833 .556 .722 .579 .586 .595 .226 
Significance of r .0001 .0127 .0008 .0094 .0085 .0075 .199 
The Effect on 
Average Opinions 
Per Judge 
Correlation (r) .584 .428 .471 .413 .413 .522 .033 
Significance of r .0142 .0491 .0329 .0559 .0561 .0191 .451 
opinions per state and the total opinions per million persons rose 
with the population. But soon after 1880, these numbers began to 
diverge. After reaching a peak of 201 in 1880, the number of opin-
ions per million persons per year has shown a consistent downward 
trend, averaging a fairly level forty-two since the end of World War 
II. The average number of opinions per state, however, continued to 
rise, although at an irregular rate, and reached its high point in 1915, 
when the sixteen courts issued an average of 291 opinions. It then 
began a generally downward move, bottoming at 119 opinions per 
year at the end of World War II. Thereafter, the average number of 
opinions rose roughly in relation to population growth. In 1970, the 
sixteen courts wrote an average of 167 opinions per year. 
The main trend shown in Graph I seems clear: from the latter 
part of the nineteenth century through the middle of the twentieth, 
state supreme court caseloads (as measured by published opinions) 
have been brought under greater control, first by breaking the rela-
tionship between population and per capita caseload, then by an ab-
solute decline in opinions even as population continued to grow. 
Individual states, of course, followed divergent patterns, and con-
sequently, as Table 1 demonstrates, the correlation between popula-
tion growth and caseloads did not decline in a linear fashion. 
During the 1870s the correlation was a strong .883; that is, in almost 
all states, population growth coincided with mounting numbers of 
supreme court opinions. From 1885 until after World War II, the 
correlation averaged a considerably lower but still substantial .6. 
During those years, caseloads in some states continued to increase 
with population growth, even as supreme courts in other states had 
begun to write fewer opinions. By the 1960s, however, the trend to-
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ward caseload control had become more uniform, and the relation-
ship between population growth and increase in caseload had 
declined to a statistically insignificant .226. 8 
We reached similar results when controlling for the number of 
judges on each court. As the lower part of Table 1 shows, population 
size has generally been positively related to the number of opinions 
per judge. But the relationship was strongest (.584) in the 1870s; by 
1970, the relationship had for all practical purposes vanished. 
11. THE STRUGGLE FOR CASELOAD CONTROL 
Notwithstanding the distinctive developments in each state, 
supreme courts in very different states, confronted with rising 
caseloads, changed in rather similar and predictable ways, although 
some states were much quicker than others to make those changes. 
The crucial developments have been in court structure and jurisdic-
tion. Two changes are especially important: grants of power to 
supreme courts to select their own cases from petitions for review, 
and the establishment of intermediate appellate courts between the 
trial courts and supreme courts. 
We can distinguish three rough phases in this evolution and three 
corresponding "types" of state supreme courts. In the first phase, 
courts had light caseloads and little or no discretion in selecting 
cases. In the second phase, courts in states with growing populations 
were burdened by heavy caseloads, but still had little case-selecting 
discretion. The courts of the third phase had light caseloads ( as 
measured by opinions issued) and great case-selecting discretion; this 
phase tended to emerge only after extended political struggle. This 
Part will discuss the three phases in tum, pausing to examine the 
patterns of transition between the second and third phases. 
A. The Low Caseload-Low .Discretion State Supreme Court 
The United States in 1870 was still predominantly a country of 
small towns, small farms, and small businesses, run by small govern-
8. The statistical significance of the relationship between population size and opinion 
caseloads should be treated cautiously. The declining significance of r (the correlation coeffi-
cient) in the 1960-1970 period is caused, in part, by the movement toward increased case con-
trol in the larger states. But it also reflects population changes in this period, producing at least 
two states with extremely large populations, California and Illinois. If the population dimen-
sion is logged (to discount the impact of extremely high population values in these two states), 
the correlation coefficients will decline over time, but the significance levels will be higher. For 
example, if population size is transformed by natural logarithms, the correlations for average 
opinions per state are .739 (1870-1880) and .500 (1960-1970), with significance levels of .0013 
and .0242 respectively. For average opinions per judge, the correlations are .61 I (1870-1880) 
and .135 (1960-1970), with significance levels of .0101 and .3086 respectively. 
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ment. The national population was about 40,000,000, less than one-
fifth of what it is today. Illinois, the fourth most populous state (af-
ter New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio) and the largest in our six-
teen-state sample, had about 2,500,000 citizens. Oregon's population 
was 90,000; Nevada's just over 42,000. The absolute volume of liti-
gation was certainly far smaller than it is today,9 though almost no 
research exists on this question. 
Most states in 1870 had only one level of appeal from their trial 
courts. Of the sixteen states in our sample, only New Jersey had an 
appellate court between its trial court of general jurisdiction and its 
highest court.10 In none of our sixteen states could the supreme 
court select cases from those appealed or screen out frivolous or un-
important appeals-the courts were obligated to hear and decide 
whatever cases litigants chose to appeal. In constructing their dock-
ets of business, supreme courts in the main were reactive rather than 
proactive; 11 the volume and content of their caseloads were "litigant-
controlled." 
This system worked decently enough, especially for states with 
small populations. Caseloads were not impossibly large; few 
supreme courts in 1870 decided more than 200 cases with full opin-
ions each year. Seven states in our sample never rose above one 
million in population in the nineteenth century: Maine, Rhode Is-
land, West Virginia, South Dakota, Idaho, Oregon and Nevada. 
From 1870 to 1900, their supreme courts averaged fewer than 100 
opinions per year. Five of these states remained smaller than one 
million through 1970: Maine, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Idaho 
and Nevada. Their annual supreme court caseloads in the twentieth 
century generally remained below 150 cases, and often below 100. 
9. See F. LAURENT, THE BUSINESS OF A TRIAL COURT, 100 YEARS OF CASES (1959) (a 
study of the circuit court for Chippewa County, Wisconsin); Friedman & Percival, A Tale oJ 
Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & SocY. REV. 267 (1976). 
Alameda County, California, had a population of94,000 in 1890; 716 cases were filed in supe-
rior court that year; 36% of these came to trial San Benito, a rural county in California, had a 
population of 6,400 in 1890; only 31 cases were filed and 10 tried. In the 16 states in our 
sample, there were only six counties in 1870 with over 100,000 people. (fhere were nineteen 
by 1900.) 
10. New Jersey's intermediate appellate court, called the Supreme Court, dealt only with 
cases arising "at law" as opposed to "equity." Equity cases could be appealed directly from 
the trial judge (a vice-chancellor) to the highest court, the Court of Errors and Appeals. In 
many states, trial courts of general jurisdiction heard "appeals" from the decisions of local 
magistrates or justice-of-the-peace courts which had original jurisdiction over small claims and 
petty offenses. Very often, however, the trial court of general jurisdiction did not review the 
decision of the justice of the peace or magistrate, but heard the case de novo. 
11. For this distinction, see A. REISS, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 64 (1971); Black, The 
Mobilization oJ Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 128 (1973). 
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B. The High Caseload-Low .Discretion State Supreme Court 
Other states, however, had larger populations, and some grew 
quite rapidly. Increases in population generally meant more cases in 
the trial courts.12 If the proportion of lower-court litigants who ap-
peal stayed constant ( or fell at a rate slower than the rate of increase 
in the number of lower-court cases13), and if appeal remained avail-
able as of right, then we would expect population growth to bring 
more and more appeals. Our data confirm this guess. Supreme 
court opinions in some of the more populous and faster-growing 
states reached averages of 400 or 500 a year. 
In California and Michigan, population doubled between 1870 
and 1895; the number of opinions issued each year jumped from 200 
or less in 1870 to over 550 in 1890 and 1895. North Carolina's popu-
lation took longer to double (its population was 1. 1 million in 1870, 
and 2.2 million in 1910), but its supreme court also doubled its out-
put, from 208 opinions in 1870 to an average of 440 in 1910 and 
1915. In Illinois, where the population had reached three million, 
the supreme court issued 624 opinions in 1875. When population 
topped one million in Alabama and Minnesota, the supreme court 
caseloads quickly grew to over 350 per year. 14 
A court whose caseload jumps in a short time to 300, 400, or 500 
cases a year cannot be quite the same kind of court as one which 
decides 50, 75, or 100 cases. Courts, of course, have a certain capac-
ity to accommodate increases in business. Judges can do less re-
search on their own and lean more on the research of lawyers. 
Judges can spend less time on each case, restrict oral argument, or 
eliminate it entirely. They can limit the length of briefs and produce 
shorter or even brief "per curiam" opinions. 15 Still, supreme court 
12. The limited research on the subject suggests that litigation rises absolutely with popula-
tion growth; however, the rate per 1,000 population does not necessarily increase. See Fried-
man & Percival, supra note 9, at 292. 
13. Many factors, of course, affect the propensity to appeal: the dollar amount at stake in 
litigation; the costs of appeal (including delay, printing costs, and counsel fees); the attitude of 
appellate courts toward technical errors at trial; and the proportion of litigants who are, in 
Galanter's terms, organized "repeat players," like insurance companies, who have full-time 
specialists in appeals. See Galanter, Why the ''Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SoCY. REv. 95 (1974). See also Casper & Posner, A Study of 
the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (1974); Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman, & 
Wheeler, supra note 2. 
14. The phenomenon occurred later for some smaller states. Oregon doubled in size, from 
about 300,000 to about 700,000 between 1890 and 1910; its supreme court's caseload jumped 
from an average of 137 opinions in 1890 and 1895 to 257 in 1910 and 1915. Nevada's popula-
tion boomed in the 1960s, growing from 200,000 in 1950 to 500,000 in 1970. Its supreme court 
had averaged fewer than 50 opinions each year; in 1970, it wrote 281. 
15. As long ago as 1880, dozens of cases from the New York Court of Appeals were re-
ported briefly each year in the form of short, gnomic opinions. In 1928, that court heard 609 
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judges must read at least some briefs, consider competing arguments, 
decide cases, and write opinions. If their caseload doubles, the 
judges are harder pressed to keep up, unless they can devise some 
drastic shortcuts or divisions of labor. 16 
In any event, judges on busy courts had less time to invest in each 
case than their predecessors who heard fewer cases. At the least, the 
flood of cases threatened the quality of decision-making, and some 
supreme courts clearly saw it that way. 17 Lawyers and legal scholars 
in the early twentieth century often complained of intolerable delays 
in the state supreme courts. They also complained that there was not 
enough time for oral argument or for judges to discuss cases among 
themselves, and that high courts wasted time on trivial cases. More-
over, some critics contended that the hard-pressed judges relied 
mechanically on precedent and wrote excessively formalistic opin-
ions which offered only feeble guidance for lower courts and the 
bar. 18 Of course, our data cannot measure directly the effect of the 
bursting caseloads on. the thoughtfulness and craftsmanship of deci-
sions in the late nineteenth century. But between 1870 and 1900, 
cases, but issued only 280 written opinions. Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 
CALIF. L. RE.v. 486, 492 (1930). North Carolina's supreme court issued 429 opinions and 44 
per curiam opinions in 1929. See Open Court, Does Our Supreme Court Need Relief?, 8 
N.C.L. REV. 487,488 (1930). California, like some other states, has recently tried to control its 
multiplying intermediate appellate court opinions; only "significant" cases (a minority) are 
supposed to be published. See Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication of 
Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. RE.v. 791 (1975). Not everyone approved of per curiam 
opinions; see the caustic comments of Henry S. Manley in Nonpareil Among Judges, 34 COR-
NELL L.Q. 50 (1948). For general information on the use of per curiam opinions, see Institute 
of Judicial Administration, Appellate Courts. Internal Operating Procedures. Preliminary 
Report (1957). 
16. In some states, too, constitutional requirements made shortcuts difficult. For example, 
CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 24: "all decisions of the Supreme Court . • . shall be given in writing, 
and the grounds of the decision shall be stated." The provision was repealed in 1966. 
17. Recently the judges of Rhode Island's supreme court, who handled only 200 cases a 
year, complained bitterly that they were not able to devote as much time to each case as they 
wanted to, to write the kind of opinions they wished to, or to keep up with legal periodicals 
and other important decisions. Beiser, The Rhode Island Supreme Court: A We/I-Integrated 
Political System, 8 LAW & SocY. REV. 167, 173 (1973). 
18. See R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 160-64 (1972) (originally published in 
1930); Dodd, The Problems of Appellate Courts, 6 AM. L. ScH. REV. 681 (1930); Foreman, The 
Law's Delays, 13 MICH. L. RE.v. 100 (1914J; R. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction 
with the Administration of Justice (1906) (address before the American Bar Association), re-
printed in W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS 69 (1974); Sunder-
land, The Problems of Appellate Review, 5 TEXAS L. REV. 126 (1927). See also K. LLEWELLYN, 
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); Horwitz, The Rise of Legal 
Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251 (1975). 
California, by constitutional provision (CAL CONST. art. 6, § 24), made judges' salaries 
depend on a monthly affidavit that the docket contained no undecided cases older than 90 
days. In the early twentieth century, California Supreme Court judges had slipped I I months 
behind in their salaries. See Sloss, MC Sloss and the Caltfamia Supreme Court, 46 CALIF. L. 
RE.v. 715, 718 n.5 (1958). 
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courts with heavy caseloads did differ from their less burdened coun-
terparts in several distinct ways. Table 2 presents evidence of the 
possible effects of caseload on three variables that may bear on the 
quality of opinions in supreme courts: their length, 19 density of cita-
tions, and tendency to cite authorities other than cases. 
TABLE 2 
THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF CASELOAD ON THREE MEASURES OF THE 
QUALITY OF STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS, 1870-1900 
Average Number 









AVERAGE STATE SUPREME COURT OPINION LENGTH, IN PAGES 
Longer than Median 
Ill. (4.2) 



















PERCENT OF STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS CONTAINING 
CITATIONS TO MORE THAN EIGHT PRECEDENTS 
More than Median 
Ala. (42.l) 
Kan. (30.l) 


















• Except for Kansas, the average was over 300. 
•• Except for Tennessee, the average was 136 or less. 
19. In order to standardize page lengths for varying print types, margins, and page sizes 
across time and jurisdictions, we sampled cases in each state and time period (using "official 
May 1978] 
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PERCENTAGE OF STATE SUPREME COURT CASES WITH CITATIONS 
TO LEGAL WRITING (TREATISES, ENCYCLOPEDIAS, 
LAW REVIEWS) 





















• Except for Kansas, the average was over 300. 
•• Except for Tennessee, the average was 136 or less. 
As Table 2 shows, the relationships vary a good deal in strength, 
but on the average, courts with larger caseloads wrote opinions 
which were shorter, which used fewer citations, and which referred 
less often to treatises, legal encyclopedias, and law reviews. Al-
though by no means overwhelming, the evidence is fairly consis-
tent. 20 
It would be rash to conclude from these :findings that the deci-
sions of heavy-caseload supreme courts were slap-dash or ill-consid-
ered; conciseness can be a virtue and long strings of citations can be 
a vice.21 These :findings are consistent, however, with the idea that 
reports" rather than West's Regional Reporters) to estimate average characters per page. The 
page-length variable was then calculated by multiplying the number of pages in each opinion 
by the average number of characters per page for that state-time sampling point. We divided 
this estimate of total characters per opinion by the national average of characters per page 
(2782.1) to create a standardized page consistent for all jurisdictions and time periods. 
20. We should note that'some possible consequences oflower caseloads do not show up 
during this period. Courts with low caseloads presumably had more time to indulge in dissent-
ing and concurring opinions, but we do not find significant differences. In the heavy-caseload 
courts, 8.3% of the opinions were not unanimous, compared to 9.4% for the low-caseload 
courts. Nor were there significant differences in case results. Supreme courts that averaged 
over 200 opinions per year reversed, on the average, 43.7% of all appeals; the low-volume 
courts reversed 46.1%. 
21. Indeed, one of the supposed symptoms of"formalism," a dread disease of courts, is the 
habit of deciding cases on the basis of authority rather than reasoned principles. This, argua-
bly, induces excessive citation (though, in theory at least, if a judge cited many cases, he may 
have searched for the ones that really "fit" in some nonformal way). Length sometimes indi-
cates that there was no time to edit. Francis A. Leach grumbled in 1911 that judges "dictate 
their opinions to stenographers .... Few men can dictate with that conciseness with which 
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courts with massive caseloads were forced to limit the time, effort, 
and research devoted to each case. This may have increased the risk 
of routine, poorly crafted opinions. 
C. Patterns of Adaptation to High Caseload 
How do organizations in general react to an increasing volume of 
business? A common way is to hire more staff. More staff means 
more people to supervise and coordinate, and it leads to functional 
specialization and more layers of authority. The organizations grow 
and take on the familiar bureaucratic form.22 
But growth also makes possible economies of scale. The organi-
zation works out routines and rules to cover recurring problems. 
Nonroutine problems are shifted to top officials, who have experts on 
their staff.23 A complex organization also tries to stabilize its rela-
tionship with the outside world. It attempts to "smooth out" fluctua-
tions in demands that flow in, sometimes by rationing its services.24 
Sometimes it feels it will be better off by taking on some jobs too 
important to leave to outsiders. A steel mill, for example, might 
want to control the sources of iron or coal; a police department 
might patrol aggressively instead of relying entirely on citizens' com-
plaints. 
A supreme court faced with growing demands on its time, and 
worried about the quality of its work, might want to use these classic 
adaptations. That would mean more staff, new levels of courts, per-
haps more specialized appellate bodies, and more efficient ways to 
allocate judicial work. Such a court would want to limit the number 
and kinds of appeals that it received. Ideally, it would enunciate 
general rules or principles that lower courts could apply routinely 
and accurately, so that it need hear only the most serious and impor-
tant cases. 
How could a supreme court ensure that it heard those cases, and 
only those? It would have to develop a system for identifying signifi-
they can write." And the "free use of mechanical devices such as typewriters" was another 
enemy of condensation. Leach, The Length of Judicial Opinions, 21 YALE L.J. 141, 144 (1911). 
22. See generally Blau, A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations, 35 AM. Soc. 
REV. 201 (1970); Starbuck, Organizational Growth and Development, in HANDBOOK OF 0ROA• 
NIZATIONS 451 (J. March ed. 1965). 
23. See Starbuck, supra note 22, at 478-81. On the vertical division of labor (between 
policy-making and administration), see H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR ch. I (2d ed. 
i957). On the routinization of decision and "search" procedures, see R. CYERT & J. MARCH, 
A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963), and J. MARCH & H. SIMON, 0ROANIZATIONS 
ch. 6 (1958). See also Polsby, The Institutionalization of the ll.S. House of Representatives, 62 
AM. POL. SCI. REv. 144 (1968). 
24. J. THOMPSON, 0ROANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967). 
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cant legal problems and screening out the trivial ones; it would not 
leave the selection process to the whims and pocketbooks of litigants. 
A professional staff to help research and write might be more relia-
ble than litigants' lawyers, who differ widely in ability, integrity, and 
energy. The state's highest court, wrote Cardozo in 1927, exists not 
for the "individual litigant, but for the indefinite body of liti-
gants. . . . The wrongs of aggrieved suitors are only the algebraic 
symbols from which the court is to work out the formula of jus-
tice."25 In short, busy state supreme courts would strive to become 
less reactive, less controlled by litigants, more self-directed and bu-
reaucratically organized. 
Reform-minded jurists, like those who founded the American Ju-
dicature Society, shared these notions. "[S]cientific management is 
needed in a modem court," wrote Roscoe Pound, "no less than in a 
modem factory."26 Reformers pressed for integrated, rational court 
structures, supported by administrative staffs, to monitor the fl.ow of 
business and assure that judicial manpower was sensibly allocated. 
They called in particular for intermediate appellate courts and they 
felt a supreme court should be able to choose its cases and write its 
own rules of procedure. 
Some of these steps toward reorganization were taken, but some 
were not. Not until the 1960s did most large and medium-sized 
states establish intermediate appellate courts and allow supreme 
courts substantial discretion over caseloads. Through much of the 
past century, many state supreme courts struggled along year after 
year, writing 400 or more opinions, using techniques and procedures 
that had hardly changed in generations. Nonetheless, several differ-
ent adaptations to the caseload problem can be distinguished. 
1. Early Intermediate Appellate Courts and .Discretion 
Among our sixteen sample states, New Jersey, Tennessee, and 
West Virginia were unusually successful in controlling the volume of 
25. B. CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK 11 (2d ed. 1909), quoted in Dodd, supra note 18, at 689-90 (1930). Actually, if judicial 
evolution followed theories of organizational rationalization, we might expect state supreme 
courts to aggregate groups of cases raising similar problems, instead of taking them up one by 
one. We might expect such courts to hear the views of a variety of affected interests, not just of 
those who happened to be parties to a particular case. Such a court might call for reports on 
the consequences of its decisions and try to acquire more administrative and rule-making pow-
ers over all the state's courts. In sum, if organization theory dictated judicial structure, state 
supreme courts would evolve toward organizations resembling regulatory commissions or the 
top levels of other large organizations. Of course, as we shall see, there are a number of rea-
sons why that did not happen. 
26. R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 286 (1940); see Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 
35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921). 
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their supreme courts' caseloads, and they began this process remark-
ably early. New Jersey, as we saw, had established an intermediate 
appellate court for cases "at law" (as opposed to equity) in 1844. 
This court, called the Supreme Court, was later divided into several 
three-judge panels, each of which heard appeals from different trial 
courts.27 Although New Jersey's highest court, the Court of Errors 
and Appeals, could not reject appeals from the lower appellate 
courts, its volume remained extraordinarily small, averaging 145 
opinions per year between 1900 and 1935, even though the state's 
population grew from 1.8 million to 4 million. 28 
Tennessee established an intermediate appellate court for equity 
cases in 1895 and for all civil cases in 1907. The state expanded this 
Court of Civil Appeals in 1925. The supreme court's caseload re-
mained at 150 opinions or fewer throughout the century. West Vir-
ginia, a smaller state, controlled its supreme court's caseload without 
intermediate appellate courts. Rather, from 1872 on, it allowed the 
supreme court to screen appeals and to reject those clearly without 
merit.29 
2. Functional Equivalents for Intermediate Appellate Courts 
California's experience exemplifies the full battery of methods 
used to control heavy caseloads. In the late nineteenth century, Cali-
fornia responded to rapid growth by increasing the size of its 
supreme court-from three to five judges in the 1860s. In 1879, 
when the court was hearing over 500 cases a year and writing 350 
27. See R. POUND, supra note 26, at 221-22; Clevenger, Courts of New Jersey (pt. 2), 18 
N.J.L.J. 195, 200 (1895); Dodd, supra note 18, at 682. 
28. The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals was a very cumbersome body, and this 
may have discouraged appeals. The court had sixteen members: nine members of the Supreme 
Court, the Chancellor (head of the courts of equity), and six special judges, who were not 
necessarily lawyers. According to A. VANDERBILT, CHANGING LAW: A BIOGRAPHY OF AR-
THUR T. VANDERBILT 169 (1976), collegial interaction on the huge court, which sat only three 
times a year for two-week terms, was often limited. 
29. The W. VA. CONST. of 1872, art. VIII,§ 6, allowed appeals to the supreme court only 
after the court "shall have examined and considered the record and assignment of errors, and 
is satisfied that there is error in the same, or that it presents a point proper for the considera-
tion of the supreme court of appeals." The court rejected many petitions for review-40 out of 
189 in 1903. In the 1920s and early 1930s, according to a study published in 1931, the court 
refused an average of 230 cases out of the yearly average of 535 cases presented, a refusal rate 
of over 40%. See Bell, Our Appellate System, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH AN-
NUAL MEETING OF THE WEST VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION 124 (1931). The West Virginia 
State Supreme Court averaged 147 opinions in 1900-1910, 250 in 1915-1930, and only slightly 
more than 100 in 1935-1970. See also Kenna, The Supreme Court, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WEST VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION 122, 124-25 (1934); 
Rose, The Modus Operandi of the Supreme Court of Appeals, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 103 (1943). 
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opinions, the number of justices was increased to seven.30 The court 
was also authorized in 1879 to divide into three-judge panels or de-
partments to hear cases separately. The full court gathered en bane 
only for extraordinarily important cases. Other states, too, adopted 
this innovation.31 The department system was also important be-
cause it recognized differences among appeals. Some appeals were 
more "significant" than others; the less important were treated in one 
way, more important cases in another. In effect, the division into 
panels created two intermediate appellate courts-or at least alterna-
tive supreme courts-for most appeals.32 
The California Supreme Court judges issued 402 opinions in 
1885, 122 en bane and 280 in departments. At this point, the legisla-
ture authorized the court to delegate to three "commissioners" power 
to hear cases and make preliminary decisions. Commissioners, in 
effect, were auxiliary judges ( or, perhaps, highly trained and experi-
enced staff members). The court could review and modify the com-
missioners' opinions, but in practice it simply issued them as its 
own.33 This innovation, too, gave the supreme court some choice of 
cases it wished to concentrate on. The California Supreme Court 
continued to produce a prodigious number of opinions (well over 
500 in 1895 and 1900), but the judges themselves wrote only 300 per 
year, 100 en bane, 200 in departments; commissioners handled an-
other 200. 
The use of commissioners was discontinued in 1904, when Cali-
fornia set up a system of intermediate appellate courts, called courts . 
of appeals. In some types of cases, litigants could appeal only to a 
court of appeals; in others, they could go directly from the trial court 
to the supreme court. The California Supreme Court could, how-
ever, transfer some of its cases to the court of appeals. It also had 
discretion to review decisions of the lower appellate courts.34 Al-
30. See Blume, Cal!fomia Courts in Historical Perspective, 22 HASTINGS L. REV. 121 
(1970). 
31. See R. POUND, supra note 26, at 215-17; Sharp, Supreme Courts Sitting in J)ivisions, 10 
N.C.L. REV. 351 (1932). 
32. Sometimes, the California Supreme Court granted a rehearing en bane after a three-
judge department had first decided the case. In such instances, the department acted much 
like an intermediate appellate court, except that the three judges of the department also took 
part in the full decision. See Sloss, supra note 18, at 715, 719. 
33. Other states also used the "commission" system to help supreme courts reduce their 
backlogs-New York from 1887 to 1893; Oregon, 1907-1909; Minnesota, 1913-1930; South 
Dakota, 1925-1931; and Illinois, 1927-1933. See R. POUND, supra note 26, at 201. 
34. After 1900, California made much less use of its right to sit in divisions. In the cases 
sampled from 1900, 1905, and 1910, two-thirds of the California Supreme Court decisions were 
rendered by a three-judge department; for the 1915, 1920, and 1925 cases, fewer than one-third 
were decided by a department. In 1930-1940, all but 7.5% were decided en bane. See also 
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though the supreme court gradually transferred more and more of its 
cases to the court of appeals, it still averaged over 250 opinions a 
year from 1910 to 1935, most of them decided en bane. 
3. The Weak Intermediate Appellate Court System 
Illinois wove a differe:t;1t pattern. It created an intermediate ap-
pellate court in 1877 (when its supreme court heard over 600 cases) 
but allowed these courts only a limited role. Appellants could still 
proceed directly from trial courts to supreme court as of right unless 
the amount at issue was less than $1,000. Moreover, appeals from 
the lower appellate court to the supreme court were available as of 
right. 
The Illinois Supreme Court caseload fell to an average of 240 
opinions in 1880 and 1885, but by 1900 and 1905, as population and 
litigation grew, the volume had climbed back to an average of 475 
opinions per year. Statutory amendments in 1909 further limited ap-
peals to the supreme court; however, litigants could still appeal di-
rectly in felony, tax, real estate, and most constitutional cases. The 
supreme court's caseload remained high. The court seemed reluc-
tant to use its discretionary power to deny appeals from the appellate 
courts; hence, double appeals were common.35 As late as 1958, court 
reformers in Illinois complained that the supreme court was "ham-
strung," that it heard "a wide variety of cases with little legal signifi-
cance."36 
Preston, Caljfamia'sAppellate Problem, 6 CAL. ST. B.J. 291 (1931); Sloss, supra note 18, at 715. 
35. Dodd, The Work of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 21 ILL. L. REV. 207 (1926). See also 
Dodd, supra note 18, at 692 (comparing the weak use of case-selecting discretion in Illinois 
with the more vigorous use in New York). 
It was estimated in 1946 that 75% of the cases heard by the Illinois Supreme Court were 
direct appeals from inferior courts. Speck, A Study of the Illinois Supreme Court, IS U. Cm. L. 
REV. 107, 108 (1947). 
36. Kohn, Modem Courts far Illinois, 42 J. AM. Juo. Socv. 42 (1958). 
Alabama also followed the weak intermediate appellate court pattern. Alabama expanded 
its supreme court from three to seven justices in 1903 and authorized it to sit in two divisions of 
four judges each--three associate judges plus the Chief Justice, who joined each panel. 1903 
Ala. Acts 493-494 (No. 530, §§ I, 2). But the caseload, which had averaged 330 opinions per 
year in 1890, 1895, 1900 and 1905, rose to 525 in 1910. In 1911, an intermediate appellate 
court was created, and the supreme court stopped sitting in divisions. Appeals to the supreme 
court were still allowed as of right in land title cases, civil actions involving claims of more 
than $1,000, condemnation proceedings, constitutional cases, and very serious felony cases. 
See 1911 Ala. Acts 95 (No. 121, §§ I, 2). In consequence, the Alabama Supreme Court contin-
ued to have large caseloads and averaged 419 opinions per year from 1915 to 1935. Volume 
declined in the later 1930s and 1940s, as in virtually every state, but still averaged 275 per year 
in the 1950 to 1965 period. 
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4. States Without Intermediate Appellate Courts 
Other states dragged their feet even more than Illinois. Minne-
sota never established an intermediate appellate court, and its 
supreme court caseload averaged a staggering 425 cases per year 
from 1890 through 1935. The load declined during the 1940s and 
1950s without any notable change in supreme court jurisdiction, but 
it climbed again in the 1960s, and reached 332 in 1970.37 Kansas, 
after brief experiments in the 1890s with commissioners and inter-
mediate appellate courts, abandoned both.38 Its supreme court aver-
aged 407 opinions a year from 1910 to 1935. Yet here too, without 
any major structural change, the caseload dropped off; it averaged a 
high but not unbearable 225 opinions a year from 1950 to 1970. 
North Carolina had no lower appellate court until the 1960s. Its 
supreme court had averaged well over 300, and sometimes over 400, 
opinions per year since the 1890s. 
Surprisingly, Michigan, one of the big industrial states, had no 
intermediate appellate court until 1965. The supreme court issued 
438 opinions in 1880 and 413 in 1885. The legislature increased the 
court from four judges to five, and then in 1903 to eight. But this 
seemed only to invite more appeals. The caseload topped 500 cases 
from 1905 to 1915.39 In 1917, the Michigan legislature freed the 
37. Minnesota had two commissioners from 1913 to 1930, but they did not sit separately 
from the supreme court or screen routine appeals. They served, in effect, as additional 
supreme court members, which spread the opinion-writing burden from four judges to six. 
The court was expanded to seven judges in 1930, and the incumbent commissioners were ap-
pointed as ordinary judges. In 1967, the Minnesota Supreme Court began to sit in five-judge 
departments for about two-thirds of its cases. Heiberg, Social Backgrounds of Minnesota 
Supreme Court Justices, 54 MINN. L. REv. 901 (1969); Pirsig, The Work of the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota, 25 MINN. L. REv. 821 (1941); Wolfram, Notes from a Study of the Caseload of 
the Minnesota Supr{!me Court: Some Comments and Statistics on Pressures and Responses, 53 
MINN. L. REV. 939 (1969). 
38. Beginning in 1887, some Kansas Supreme Court cases were assigned to commissioners. 
(The court's annual caseload had reached almost 300.) The commissioner plan was abolished 
in 1893. In 1889, the Kansas legislature limited civil appeals to the supreme court to claims 
exceeding $100; even this rather low limit was waived for cases involving title to real estate, 
libel or slander, false imprisonment, or constitutional interpretation. The court was autho-
rized, however, to sit in divisions. Kansas established two intermediate appellate courts in 
1895. In felony cases and civil claims exceeding $1,000, however, a Kansas litigant could ap-
peal directly to the supreme court. Moreover, appeal was available as of right from the inter-
mediate to the supreme court in tax, real estate, and constitutional cases. In 1901, this "weak" 
intermediate appellate court was abolished; apparently the system was unpopular with the 
Kansas bar. In its stead, the Kansas Supreme Court was expanded to seven judges. It stopped 
sitting in divisions, however. See R. POUND, supra note 26, at 214; Note, The Kansas Court of. 
Appeals, 12 WASHBURN L. REV. 378 (1973). 
39. If a court continued to sit en bane and continued to decide cases and circulate opinions 
collegially, increasing the number of judges would do little to expand case-handling capacity. 
The addition of new judges to an overworked court often meant only that the court produced 
what were in effect one-judge opinions rubber-stamped by the judge's colleagues. See Dodd, 
supra note 18, at 688. 
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supreme court of its duty to hear appeals from civil cases where the 
amount in dispute was less than $500,40 but this had no significant 
effect on caseload, for the court continued to write over 400 opinions 
a year in the 1920s. In 1927, Michigan's supreme court gained the 
discretion to accept or reject criminal appeals, which had comprised 
an average of22% of its caseload in 1920 and 1925. That percentage 
was considerably reduced after 1927, but the court still wrote more 
than 400 opinions a year in the 1930s. As was true of almost every 
supreme court, the Michigan court's caseload declined sharply in the 
1940s.41 Still, the court averaged 256 opinions a year from 1945 to 
1960. Caseload was controlled partly by holding criminal cases to an 
unusually low 12% of the docket. 
5. Some Speculations on the Politics of State Supreme Court 
Reorganization 
We are not sure why supreme court caseloads remained so high 
so long in so many states, and why structural reform did not come 
sooner. One crucial factor, it would seem, is that in many states the 
structure of the judicial system was embedded-one might say fro-
zen-in the state constitution. For many reasons, too, legislators and 
political leaders were uninterested in reform, or opposed to it out-
right. Politicians certainly did not see backlogs and overloads in the 
supreme court as the most pressing problem of the day. Spending 
money on salaries for new intermediate appellate judges was never 
politically inviting. The work of some state courts was controversial. 
Judges were sometimes perceived as reactionaries and as enemies of 
social legislation; to give such judges more power and discretion 
would only encourage "government by judiciary."42 Supreme court 
40. Pub. Act No. 172, 1917 Mich. Pub. Acts 347. The $500 minimum for appeals as of 
right was repealed in 1919, Pub. Act No. 14, 1919 Mich. Pub. Acts. 19-20, but reinstated in 
1923. Pub. Act No. 155, 1923 Mich. Pub. Acts 247. However, the legislature stipulated that 
even in small civil cases, a litigant could appeal to the supreme court as of right in will con-
tests, in cases construing the state constitution or a state statute, or in "any matters of great 
public importance." Pub. Act No. 155, 1923 Mich. Pub. Acts 247. Legislatures were reluctant 
to erect high jurisdictional amounts because of a widespread feeling that the "right" to appeal 
should not by law depend on wealth, directly or indirectly, though of course it did in practice if 
not in theory. 
41. Systematic caseload data for lower state courts over time do not exist. Civil litigation 
in the United States district courts declined by almost 50% in the late 1930s and 1940s, both 
absolutely and in terms of litigation rates per 1,000 population. See Grossman & Sarai, Litiga-
tion in the Federal Courts, 9 LAW & Socv. REV. 321, 336 (1975). A study of the county court in 
Chippewa County, Wisconsin, noted that litigation fell off during World War II. F. LAURENT, 
supra note 9. This, rather than changes in court structure, seems to explain the failure of 
supreme court caseloads to increase along with population in the late 1930s and the 1940s. 
42. Literature abounds on the due process activism oflate-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century state supreme courts. See L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION, 1877-1917 (1971); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW, ATTI• 
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reform was often part of a general reform package that included re-
shaping the lower courts, and thus local magistrates, justices of the 
peace, court clerks, and others who felt they might suffer in a reor-
ganization outshouted 'the few reformers. Political and party officials 
threatened with loss of patronage were also part of the opposition.43 
Indeed, supreme court judges themselves did not always strongly 
advocate reorganization. Their self-interest called for caseload con-
trol, of course; in modem court systems, more cases do not bring 
more fees or higher salaries, but simply more work. A court that 
decides 200 or fewer cases a year and concentrates on difficult and 
important problems tends to be more prestigious than one struggling 
through 400 mostly routine cases.44 But judges also have a tradition 
of reticence. It is thought unseemly for them to lobby,45 to seek 
more power, or to press for reforms that encourage the use of 
courts.46 
In addition, in some states, there seem to have been strong feel-
ings about a right to appeal. It was argued that every litigant, big or 
small, should have a chance to take his case, big or small, to the state 
supreme court. Finally, some jurists feared that reforms would im-
pair the law's uniformity and certainty. A single supreme court was 
better, the argument ran, than a multitude of commissioners, divi-
sions, or lower appellate courts, all issuing their own pronounce-
ments on "the law."47 
TUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960); B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942). A 1912 amendment to the Ohio 
constitution provided that the Ohio Supreme Court could not declare a statute unconstitu-
tional unless six of the seven justices agreed. Aumann, The Course ef Judicial Review in the 
State ef Ohio, 25 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 367 (1931). 
43. See Kohn, supra note 36 (describing the failure of one court-reform plan). 
44. Judicial prestige, however, is not necessarily related closely to caseload or case-select-
ing discretion. See the (somewhat unsatisfying) effort to measure state supreme court prestige 
in Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 295 (1936). 
45. Even in the late 1960s, some judges felt they would violate the principle of separation 
of powers if they lobbied at all. Glick, Policy-Making and State Supreme Courts: The Judiciary 
as an Interest Group, 5 LAW & SocY. REV. 271, 275 (1970) (a survey of the attitudes of state 
supreme court judges and state legislators). 
46. In the ideology of American law, litigation is not to be encouraged; delays and jam-ups 
have the "function" of making litigation unpalatable. See Friedman, Legal Rules and the 
Process ef Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786, 798-800 (1967). 
47. The Chief Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court opposed sitting in divisions, fearing 
that "the course of decision would not be uniform." See Sharp, supra note 31, at 363. Inter~ 
mediate appellate courts were also criticized as an invitation to double appeals (thus increasing 
the cost and uncertainty of litigation). See Sunderland, Intermediate Appellate Courts, 6 AM. 
L. SCH. REV. 693, 694 (1930), and Sunderland, supra note 18, at 138. The short-lived Kansas 
experiment with intermediate appellate courts, see note 38 supra, opposed by the bar, is yet 
another case in point. In addition, see Preston, supra note 34, at 296: "[T]here seems to be a 
feeling in the minds of the bar that when cases come up [to the Supreme Court] from the 
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But ideologies have been shifting over the years. Gradually, 
judges have espoused a somewhat different view of themselves and 
their roles. "Sociological jurisprudence" and legal realism have 
made their mark. At least some state supreme court judges now feel 
that making policy is an inevitable part of their work,48 and they 
wonder whether they should not approach it more systematically. 
To do so, they must be able to winnow out the trivial cases and con-
centrate on the important. That cannot be done without structural 
reform, intermediate appellate courts, control over dockets, and 
larger staffs. 
Meanwhile, reform has become better organized. Since 1917, the 
American Judicature Society has published a journal which stresses 
judicial reform. Since the 1920s, state judicial councils, staffed by 
judges and legislators, have gathered statistics on court business, is-
sued reports and recommendations, and lobbied for reform.49 
Nevertheless, state supreme courts have not acquired caseload 
control easily; it has been a long, complicated process, heavily de-
pendent on the political skill of judicial reformers and on the local 
political climate.50 Apparent victories have often been subverted. 
'Kansas established an intermediate appellate court in 1895 and abol-
ished it six years later. Illinois set up a lower appellate court, but still 
allowed direct appeals to the supreme court for cases involving cer-
tain politically important interests. Not until the 1960s did the re-
formers gain real momentum. Only eleven states had intermediate 
courts in 1948; by 1970, twenty-three did.51 
Why reform accelerated in the 1960s is not completely clear. In 
1962, the American Bar Association endorsed the model statewide 
District Court of Appeals they are entitled to be heard in bank, and that the bar would not be 
satisfied with a department opinion." 
48. See H. GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE Ju-
DICIAL ROLE (1971). 
49. See Glick, supra note 45; Pound, The Function and Prospects of the Judicial Council, 23 
J. AM. Juo. SocY. 53 (1939). 
50. See L. Pelekoudas, Judicial Reform in Ten States (1963) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Univer-
sity of Illinois). 
Kentucky recently voted to establish a system of intermediate appellate courts and to give 
its heavy-caseload supreme court great case-selecting discretion. Some observers attributed 
the judicial reformers' election victory to the overconfidence of perennially successful (in pre-
vious years) opponents of reform, primarily the local magistrates. Even so, the reform meas-
ure carried by only 35,000 votes, a margin it owed to voters in big cities and suburbs, and was 
defeated in 101 of Kentucky's 120 counties. Kentucky Brings Order to Its Courts, L.A. Times, 
Dec. 16, 1977, Part VII, at 1, col. 1. 
51. Fair, Stale Intermediate Appellate Courts: An Introduction, 24 W. POL. Q. 415, 415 
(1971). 
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Judicature Act of the American Judicature Society.52 The work of 
the Warren Court, and the ferment of the 1960s, may have helped 
build a reform-minded climate of opinion. Organized litigants, such 
as civil rights groups and "public interest" law firms, urged the 
courts to engage in social and legal reform. 53 Support for reform 
may also have sprung from more conservative sources. Some judges 
who were unhappy with the dramatic increase of criminal appeals 
and auto accident cases in the 1960s may have wanted the supreme 
courts to be able to screen out such cases and to concentrate once 
again on matters important to business and industry.54 
D. The Low Caseload-High .Discretion State Supreme Court 
By the end of the 1960s, most of the medium-sized and larger 
states in our sample of sixteen had created intermediate appellate 
courts and given their supreme courts substantial discretion to select 
cases from petitions for review. (Kansas and Minnesota were the 
only exceptions.) Consequently, supreme court caseloads, as mea-
sured by opinions issued, were sharply reduced. 
New Jersey is one example. With Chief Justice Arthur Vander-
bilt providing strong leadership, a new constitution was adopted in 
1948 which abolished separate courts of equity, set up a comprehen-
sive system of intermediate appellate courts, reorganized the 
supreme court, and gave it broad power to make its own rules and 
select its own cases.55 An administrative office for the courts was 
52. See Winters & Allard, Judicial Selection and Tenure in the United Slates, in THE 
COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 151 (H. Jones ed. 1965). 
53. On the rise of the "public interest bar," see Rabin, Lawyers far Social Change: Perspec-
tives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976); Comment, The New Public Interest 
Lawyers, 19 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970). 
54. Criminal appeals in particular were often considered legally unmeritorious. In fact, 
criminal appellants won only 33.8% of their appeals in our sample between 1940 and 1970. In 
all other categories, appellants won almost 40% of the time. The success rate of criminal cases 
in state supreme courts was lower than that of any other major case category (e.g., family, 
estates, property, torts, public law, contracts). Moreover, criminal appeals were particularly 
unsuccessful in the 1960s, when the number of criminal cases on supreme court dockets in-
creased dramatically; only 28% of the criminal defendants prevailed in the 1965 sample, and 
26.3% in the 1970 cases. A Michigan Supreme Court justice remarked, "After an experience of 
many years, I can say that • . . there is but seldom a semblance of merit in these petitions to 
appeal or for habeas corpus in criminal cases." Butzel, Judge Butzel Reminisces, MICH. ST. 
B.J., Dec. 1955, at 30. R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE 
COURTS 10 (1976), states: "In years gone by there was a tendency to downgrade the impor-
tance of criminal cases. The 'great cases' arose from civil litigation, and appellate judges shied 
away from criminal appeals when they could." Leflar goes on to say that these attitudes have 
been changing, but he acknowledges that "the percentage of frivolous criminal appeals is un-
doubtedly higher than that of frivolous civil appeals," and he urges judges not to "shrug off" 
criminal appeals as "less important matters to be handled . . • more summarily than others." 
Id. at 11. 
55. See Brennan, .Does Business Have a Role in Improving Judicial Administration?, 28 PA. 
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established. The New Jersey Supreme Court averaged only 141 
opinions a year from 1950 to 1970; it became known as a distin-
guished and innovative court.56 
The California Supreme Court, which averaged 166 opinions per 
year in the 1950s and 1960s, was one of the most influential supreme 
courts in the country. It had great discretion over its caseload, and 
its professional staff _was enormous by traditional standards. By 
1970, each of the six associate justices had three research attorneys 
(law clerks), at least one of whom was an experienced lawyer who 
held the position permanently, while the others were recent law 
school graduates with outstanding academic records. The chief jus-
tice had twelve research attorneys supervised by a senior research 
attorney. A substantial number of "externs," second- and third-year 
law students from California law schools, also served the staff. 
Clerks screened petitions for review and wrote conference memo-
randa. When the justices decided to hear a case, they assigned it to a 
single justice who, with his staff, prepared a pre-argument "calendar 
memorandum." This usually became _the basis for the court's opin-
ion. 57 
In the 1960s, several other states followed the lead of New Jersey 
and California. In Oregon, postwar population growth pushed the 
supreme court's volume over 300 opinions per year in 1960. An in-
termediate appellate court for tax cases was established in 1961, for 
most other types of cases in 1969.58 A 1964 amendment to the Illi-
nois constitution gave the supreme court more control over its cases. 
The absolute right of appeal to the supreme court was abolished for 
real property cases, felony cases, and cases in which the state was a 
party.59 Tennessee added an intermediate court for criminal cases in 
B.A.Q. 238, 241 (1957). In addition, methods of hearing and deciding cases were reorganized 
to increase the preparation and discussion the judges granted each case. See A. VANDERBILT, 
supra note 28, at 170-73; Vanderbilt, Our New Judicial Establishment: The Record of the First 
Year, 4 RUTGERS L. REv. 353 (1950). 
56. New Jersey Supreme Court opinions were more widely cited than those of any of the 
other state supreme courts in our sample except California. See Table 5 i'!fra. 
51. See Goodman & Seaton, Foreword: Ripe for .Decision, Internal Workings and Current 
Concerns of the Cal!fomia Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 309 (1974). 
58. Smith, An Historical Sketch of Oregon's Supreme Court, 55 ORE. L. REV. 85, 93 (1976). 
Confronted with a rising caseload in the early 1960s, the Oregon Supreme Court often divided 
into two three-judge departments that heard "less important" cases, supplemented by "pro tern 
justices." OREGON JUDICIAL COUNCIL, THE COURTS OF OREGON 5 (1967). On earlier periods 
in Oregon, see Tongue, .Delays on Appeals lo the Oregon Supreme Court, 36 ORE. L. REV. 253 
(1957). 
59. Appeals were still available as of right in tax and constitutional cases, habeas corpus 
cases, and in cases concerning the State Industrial Commission or the State Commerce Com-
mission. See ILL. CONST art. 6, § 5; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 28-1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.28-1 
(1965). 
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1967. (It had had one for civil cases for years.) Michigan established 
a system of intermediate appellate courts in 1965. The supreme 
court, granted nearly complete discretion over its docket, issued 
ninety-six opinions in 1970, compared with an average of almost 230 
in 1960 and 1965. North Carolina added appellate courts and gave 
its supreme court full control of its docket in 1967. The caseload 
dropped from 473 to 118.60 In 1969, Alabama expanded the jurisdic-
tion of its intermediate courts and gave its supreme court broad case-
selecting discretion. 61 
This increasing discretion and diminishing caseload implied cor-
responding changes in the function of the supreme courts. It sug-
gested an emerging societal consensus that state supreme courts 
should not be passive, reactive bodies, which simply applied "the 
law" to correct "errors" or miscarriages of justice in individual cases, 
but that these courts should be policy-makers and, at least in some 
cases, legal innovators.62 After the 1967 reform in North Carolina, 
the supreme court, it was said, could now concentrate on "truly sig-
nificant questions of law."63 Even in smaller states, the ideal was a 
low-volume, well-staffed supreme court which "delegated" routine 
appeals and supervision of trial courts to lower appellate courts and 
concentrated on important, far-reaching cases. Rhode Island's 
supreme court had no case-selecting discretion; one justice com-
plained in 1974 that half of the court's cases "don't belong in the 
highest court of a state."64 Moreover, requiring appellants to peti-
60. See Groot, The Ejfects of an Intermediate Appellate Court on the Supreme Court Work 
Product: The North Carolina Experience, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 548, 562-69 (1971). 
61. Alabama's intermediate appellate courts were designated the exclusive appellate courts 
for criminal cases, all civil cases under $10,000, and all administrative appeals, except where 
the supreme court chose in its discretion to take a case. ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 3 (1975). See 
Bloodworth, Remodeling the Alabama Appellate Courts, 23 ALA. L. REV. 353 (1971). On the 
preceding period, see Note, Alabama Appellate Court Congestion: Observations and Suggestions 
from an Empirical Study, 21 ALA. L. REV. 150 (1968). 
62. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 54, at 1-2 (a volume prepared in conjunction with the Ap-
pellate Judges' Conference of the American Bar Association). Appeals, writes Leflar, are no 
longer "heard only for the purpose of correcting errors committed in trial courts." Now state 
supreme courts are "to give authoritative expression to the developing body of the law." Leflar 
notes with approval that since "opposing parties and their counsel do not invariably present all 
sides of an issue," courts more often invite briefs on issues the judges think important and 
decide cases formerly regarded as moot. He adds that as "the lawmaking function of appellate 
courts is more clearly recognized . . . the apparent justification for strictures against . . . ren-
dering advisory opinions diminishes correspondingly." Id. at 5-6. See also Baum, Policy 
Goals in Judicial Gatekeeping: A Proximity Model of Discretionary Jurisdiction, 21 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 13 (1977). 
63. Groot, supra note 60, at 554 (quoting THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, STATE OF NORTH 
CAROLINA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 7 
(1968)). 
64. Beiser, supra note 17, at 174. A California lawyer, speaking about cases decided by his 
father, who sat on the California Supreme Court from 1906 to 1919, observed that many of 
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tion the court for a share of its precious time encouraged a new, 
more policy-oriented judicial role. Appellants could not merely ar-
gue that the trial court had committed "errors." They had to demon-
strate that they deserved to be heard for special reasons. When 
addressing the modem high-discretion supreme court, therefore, ap-
pellants often emphasized the case's legal significance and social 
consequences, for which the court was urged to assume responsibil-
ity. 
E. A Typology of State Supreme Courts 
Table 3, which shows the population and caseload for each state 
in seven time periods, summarizes the movement toward caseload 
control. We grouped the states by the "type" into which they fell 
during most of the 1870-1970 period. Because of their dramatic 
shifts, we placed Oregon and California in the type that best charac-
terized them in the last two decades. The three types, which repre-
sent different combinations of population, supreme court caseload, 
and discretion, are as follows: 
Type I: Low population states (under one million) with no supreme 
court case-selecting discretion, no lower appellate court, 
and relatively light caseloads. 
Rhode Island, Maine, South Dakota, Idaho, and Nevada 
were in this category throughout the century. Their 
supreme courts averaged fewer than 100 opinions per year. 
Type II: Medium-sized (over one million) and large states with little 
or no supreme court case-selecting discretion, and heavy 
caseloads. 
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Kansas, North Carolina and 
Alabama were in this category for most of the century. Or-
egon joined it in population terms in the 1930s and in 
caseload terms (over 220 opinions) in the 1915-1930 and 
1960-1970 years. These supreme courts averaged well over 
200 opinions a year in most time periods, and often 350 or 
more.65 
Type III: Medium-sized or large states with substantial controls over 
supreme court caseloads (lower appellate courts handled 
most appeals or supreme courts had wide discretion to 
choose cases) and relatively light caseloads, measured by 
published opinions. 
these cases "would now be considered far too trivial to warrant attention by the court of last 
resort." Sloss, supra note 18, at 716. This view, it should be noted, is not universally held. 
One Rhode Island Supreme Court judge stated in the early 1970s that his court's primary 
function was and (implicitly) should be correcting errors ''under the law, as it stands," rather 
than making law. Beiser, supra note 17, at 170-71. 
65. In the late 1960s, Alabama, Michigan, North Carolina, and Oregon instituted substan-
tial reforms which took them out of this category, but those changes occurred too late to have 
much effect on the data for 1940-1970, the period analyzed in the following section. 
TABLE 3 
AVERAGE POPULATION AND OPINION CASELOADS FOR STATE SUPREME COURTS, 1870-1970 
States 1870-1880 1885-1895 1900-1910 1915-1925 1930-1940 1945-1955 1960-)970 Growth Ratio• 
Population Opinion Population Opinion Population Opinion Population Opinion Population Opinion Population Opinion Population Opinion Opinions to 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Population 1945-1970 
R.I. 0.3 39 0.4 81 0.5 106 0,6 76 0.7 89 0.8 88 0.9 162 5.95 
Nev. 0.1 45 0.1 20 0.1 23 0.1 43 0.1 39 0.2 36 0.4 131 2.11 
Ida. - - 0.1 48 0.2 IOI 0.4 131 0.5 110 0.6 81 0.7 105 1,70 
Mc. 0.6 83 0.7 122 0.7 105 0.8 119 0.8 80 0.9 55 1.0 71 3.79 
S.D. - - 0.4 106 0.5 196 0.6 153 0.7 111 0.7 61 0.7 68 q,10 - -
mean 0.3 56 0.3 77 0.4 106 0.5 104 0.6 87 0.6 64 0.7 107 3.55 
N.C. 1.2 257 1.6 336 2.1 351 2.6 397 3.4 421 4.1 275 4.8 308 0.65 
Ore. 0.1 37 0.3 115 o.s 1S2 0.8 267 1.0 168 1.5 11S 2.0 274 4.84 
Ill. 2.8 448 3.9 309 S.2 43S 6.S 399 7.8 302 8.7 232 10.6 261 0.S7 
Ala. I.I 263 I.S 3S8 2.0 3S6 2.4 41S 2.7 392 3.1 268 3.4 243 -0.96 
Kan. 0.7 170 1.3 2S6 1.6 277 1.8 4S7 1.8 324 1,9 190 2.2 236 1.69 
Minn. 0.6 140 1.3 408 1.9 37S 2.4 423 2.7 3S2 3.0 162 3.6 234 2.28 
Mich, 1.4 267 2.1 S23 2.6 499 3.7 4S8 S.I 4S4 6.4 2S3 8.3 194 -0.91 
mean I.I 226 1.7 329 2.3 349 2.9 402 · 3.S 345 4.1 214 5.0 248 1.16 
Cal. 0.7 314 1.2 S06 1.9 360 3,6 270 6.3 260 10.9 165 17,9 1S3 -0.IJ 
N.J. 1.0 38 I.S S7 2.2 120 3.2 138 4.1 146 4.9 132 6.6 129 -0,07 
Tenn. 1.4 229 1.8 12S 2.1 119 2.4 124 2.8 136 3.3 132 3.8 128 -0.21 
W,Va. o.s so 0.8 121 I.I 147 1.5 2S6 1.8 17S 2.0 87 1.8 93 0.69 
mean 0.9 1S8 1.3 202 1.8 187 2.7 197 3.8 179 S.3 129 7.S 126 0.08 
Grand Mean 0.9 170 1.2 2S 1.6 233 2.1 2S8 2.6 223 3.3 146 4.3 174 F - 5.29 Sig - .021 
* Growth ratio is the ratio of growth in volume of state supreme court opinions to growth of population in the state. Growth ratios have also been calculated for 
the average opinions per judge to population. The overall figures remain about the same, but the mean-differences among the three state groups are Jess 
significant. The growth ratios per judge are 3.72 for the low-discretion states, 0.72 for the mixed-discretion states and 0.16 for the high-discretion states. The F 
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New Jersey, Tennessee and West Virginia were in this cate-
gory for most of the century. California's supreme court 
joined it about 1940, when it began exercising its discretion 
to assign most appeals to the court of appeals. These 
supreme courts averaged under 200 opinions a year, and 
often fewer than 150. 
Interestingly, the states in these types did not correlate closely 
with the clusters of states ( defined by economic and social variables) 
from which we picked our sample. States from the urban-industrial 
cluster, for example, did not necessarily share the same type of 
supreme court. Rhode Island has a Type I court, Illinois and Michi-
gan had Type II courts, and New Jersey has had a Type III court. 
Alabama, a poor southern state, mingled with the rich in Type II. 
Tennessee and West Virginia, also members of the "southern" clus-
ter, joined California in Type III. Differences in the organization 
and work of state supreme courts, therefore, cannot be explained as 
direct results of differences in the social and economic character of 
the states. 
The far right column in Table 3 shows the relationship between 
changes in state population and changes in supreme court caseloads 
for the periods 1945-1955 and 1960-1970. In Nevada, for example, 
population doubled while supreme court opinions quadrupled. 
More precisely, the growth in opinions was 2.11 times as great as the 
population growth rate. In other Type I states, caseloads grew 
significantly from 1960 to 1970 even though population growth was 
negligible. Rhode Island's caseload increased by more than 80%, an 
increase almost six times greater than that of the population. Like 
Nevada, Rhode Island had no obvious mechanisms to stem the up-
surge in appeals, whatever its causes, and these two supreme courts 
issued 200 or more opinions per year by the early 1970s. They now 
stand on the brink of moving from Type I into Type II; they may 
have begun to feel pressure for greater control over caseloads. 
The ratios of opinion to population growth were more variable 
for Type II states in the 1945-1970 period. Illinois, Alabama, Michi-
gan, and North Carolina increased their supreme court's discretion 
over cases in the 1960s, and caseload growth in those states stayed 
relatively close to population growth-it was slightly ahead in Illi-
nois and North Carolina, slightly behind in Alabama and Michigan. 
On the other hand, in Kansas and Minnesota, where there were no 
lower appellate courts and where supreme courts could not select 
cases, opinions grew considerably faster than population. Oregon 
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experienced a large increase in population and the largest relative 
caseload growth. In 1960, its supreme court issued 339 opinions. 
The legislature created a system of intermediate appellate courts in 
1969, and in 1970 the supreme court published only 201 opinions. 
Substantial differences exist between the first two types of 
supreme courts and the third. The average opinion-tp-population 
ratio for Type II states was positive. For Type III states, however, 
with one exception, it was negative. Only West Virginia, whose pop-
ulation had actually declined while its supreme court caseload re-
mained low but relatively constant, had a positive ratio. Although 
Type III states, on the average, were ten times the size of Type I 
states and in absolute terms had a much larger population growth, 
their average number of supreme court opinions (126) from 1960 to 
1970 was only 19 more than the average (107) for the small states in 
Type I. The Rhode Island Supreme Court produced more opinions 
than the California Supreme Court, which sits in a state with twenty 
times Rhode Island's population. And Type III supreme courts 'is-
sued only about half as many opinions as the Type II courts. 
As we said, these differences are substantial. But are they impor-
tant? What are the consequences of the evolution of judicial struc-
tures toward the greater caseload control of Type III? Does the 
freedom of a Type III court to concentrate more of its energies on 
"important" cases make the court's work qualitatively different? 
Part III addresses this subject. 
Ill. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CASELOAD CONTROL 
We have suggested that state supreme courts fall into three differ-
ent types in terms of caseload and discretion to select cases. There 
has been a pronounced evolution toward a structure that grants high 
discretion and permits lighter caseloads. One might expect supreme 
courts even in smaller states to take this form if caseloads continue to 
grow. In this Part, we inquire whether differences in court type pro-
duced measureable changes in the types of cases that came before 
the court, in opinion style, and in case results. We concentrated on 
the 1940-1970 period, during which our courts fell rather neatly into 
three types. 
A. 'Iype of Cases 
If we take the last century .as a whole, we find a marked decline 
in the percentage of state supreme court cases that stemmed from 
private business or property transactions ( contract, debt collection, 
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real property), the categories that dominated court dockets in the late 
nineteenth century. Conversely, the number of tort, criminal, and 
public-law cases grew considerably. In the most recent third of our 
survey period-1940-1970-criminal and constitutional cases in-
creased the most sharply.66 
To a large extent, these trends are independent of the structure of 
state supreme courts. They reflect nationwide changes in society, 
economy, and law. The automobile produced more tort cases in al-
most every state from the 1920s on. Beginning in the late 1930s, as 
the rate of business failures declined, debt-collection cases declined 
in every court, regardless of caseload or the level of a state's eco-
nomic development. That trend probably reflected a stronger, more 
rational banking and credit system; deposit insurance; and perhaps 
the long boom that followed World War II. Criminal cases in-
creased dramatically in almost all state supreme courts in the 1960s, 
again regardless of structure, partly because of a rising crime rate 
and perhaps also because the Warren Court imposed on the state 
courts new due process rights for criminal defendants.67 
These trends were general but by no means uniform. In theory, 
state supreme courts with discretion to select their cases could more 
easily resist the kinds of cases litigated in great number in the lower 
courts. Had they chosen, they could have concentrated on statisti-
cally less frequent, and presumably more significant, types of cases, 
and they could have stimulated new areas of litigation. We hypothe-
sized that courts with high discretion and low caseload would tend, 
on the average, to lead the shift away from private-law cases toward 
criminal- and public-law cases and that they would also lead the 
shift toward cases raising constitutional issues. We assumed that 
high-discretion courts would be less likely to consider private-law 
cases worth their scarce time. 
The basic data appear in Table 4. The relationships between 
66. To be precise, from 1870 to 1900, contract cases (three-fourths of which were debt 
collection and creditors' rights matters) constituted 33.6% of state supreme courts' dockets and 
real property cases accounted for 21.4%. In the 1940-1970 period, contract and debt-collection 
matters declined to 15% and real property to 10.9%. Conversely, tort cases grew from 9.6% of 
state supreme courts' dockets in 1870-1900 to 22.3% in 1940-1970; auto accident cases alone 
were 7.5%; workplace-accident and workmen's compensation cases were 8.3%. Criminal cases 
swelled from 10.7% in 1870-1900 to 16% in 1955-1960, then to 28% in 1965 and 1970. Many of 
the criminal cases in the 1960s posed constitutional issues; while such issues arose in only 
18.5% of the criminal cases from 1870 to 1950, they appeared in almost 50% of the criminal 
cases from 1965 to 1970. Public-law cases (including taxation, eminent domain, election and 
public employment disputes, and administrative regulation of business)-which also often 
posed constitutional issues-rose from 12.4% in 1870-1900 to 19.4% in 1940-1970. Kagan, 
Cartwright, Friedman, & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 133-47. 

























CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES: TYPE OF CASE, 1940-1970 
Property, Contract, 
Collection, & Corporate-Law Cases 
Percent State 
Supreme Court 
Cases 1940- Percent Change 
1970 Rank Order from 1905-1935 
26.2 II - 9.5 
32.5 3 -II.I 
31.7 4 -32.6 
28.6 7 -20.6 
26.9 10 -31.8 
29.2 7 -21.1 
28,6 7 -20.S 
33,3 2 -22.2 
17,5 IS -13.5 
41,2 I -14.4 
29.3 6 -16.0 
25.4 13 -17.5 
26.2 II -25.3 
28.8 7.9 -18.5 
22.2 14 -19.9 
27.8 9 -23.8 
14.3 16 -16.7 
22.2 ...L =2J!.ll 
23.6 II -20.1 
27.6 - -19.7 
I.IS - 0.22 





Cases 1940- Percent Change 
1970 Rank Order from 1905-1935 
31.0 II 14.3 
40.S s 7.2 
30.2 12 6.4 
41.3 4 25.S 
37,4 8 19.2 
36.1 8 14.S 
38,1 6 15,9 
22.2 16 2.3 
68.3 I 18.3 
26.2 IS 8.8 
30.2 12 4.8 
28.6 14 2.4 
35,7 IO 19.8 
35,6 10.6 10.3 
48.4 3 16.7 
36.5 9 22.3 
50.0 2 9.5 
ru .L w 
43.3 s 15.7 
37.7 - 13.0 
0.65 - 0.85 
.540 - ,449 
Private Torts 
(Without Workmen's Compensation) 
Percent State 
Supreme Court 
Cases 1940- Percent Change 
1970 Rank Order from 1905-1935 
21,4 3 - 3.2 
10.3 14 7,1 
16.7 7 10.4 
15.9 8 0.1 
15.8 IO 8,7 
16.0 8,4 4.6 
12.8 12 - 5.4 
28.S I 16.6 
3.1 16 - 2.4 
IS.I II 2.4 
18,3 6 0,1 
25,4 2 9.5 
19.9 4 0.1 
17.6 7.4 3.0 
10.4 13 0.9 
19.0 s - 3.2 
7.9 IS - 2.4 
fil ..!L :.J!.1 
13.3 10.3 - 1.4 
16.0 - 2.4 
0.54 - I.I 




Cases 1940- Percent Change 
1970 Rank Order from 1905-1935 
5.6 IS 0.8 
15.9 s 3.2 
13.5 10 1.6 
14.3 8 9.5 
14.3 8 11,9 
12.7 9.2 5,4 
7,9 12 - 5.4 
7,1 13 3.2 
33,3 I 26.2 
5.6 15 - 1.6 
7.1 13 2.4 
10.3 II 4.8 
IS.I 7 7,1 
12.4 10.3 5.2 
31.8 2 12.7 
15.9 s 9.5 
16.7 4 0.8 
.12..a ....L --1.l 
21.0 3.5 7,5 
14.6 - 5.9 
1,78 - 0.13 
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type of court and type of case are not powerful, but they do point in 
the predicted direction. From 1940 to 1970, the percentage of prop-
erty, contract, collection, and corporate cases declined in every state 
(compared to 1905-1935), but courts with greater power over case 
selection tended to have lower percentages of these cases. Criminal-
and public-law cases increased in all states, but the courts with most 
case-selecting discretion had more of these, on the average. Tort 
cases (resulting primarily from automobile accidents) increased 
somewhat in the supreme court dockets of most Type I and II states, 
but they declined in higher-discretion courts, except in Calif omia, 
where they stayed steady at an already low level. 
However, the differences are by no means great, and marked in-
dividual variations exist within each type of court. Illinois, for ex-
ample, had more criminal cases and fewer private-law cases than 
most states with greater caseload discretion.68 Differences within 
types of states tended to be larger than differences among types. We 
have, then, definite but quite modest evidence that the states with 
greater caseload discretion tended to lead the generally shifting em-
phasis from "private law" to "public law" cases. 69 
Table 4 also shows that in the 1940-1970 years, Type III supreme 
courts more frequently decided constitutional issues. Cases with 
constitutional issues made up more than a fifth of the supreme court 
docket in high-discretion states, compared to about an eighth of the 
cases in other states. Caseload control does, therefore, seem to pro-
vide the courts with the ability to concentrate on frontier regions of 
law and on cases of constitutional significance. Still, despite their 
more "primitive" structure, other states participated in these trends. 
Court structure influences, but does not alone determine, the types of 
cases state supreme courts hear.70 
68. To some extent, this was an artifact of Illinois laws on jurisdiction. For most of the 
1940-1970 period, a litigant could appeal as of right to the Illinois Supreme Court from both 
trial courts and intermediate appellate courts in all felony, constitutional, and tax cases; in 
appeals from administrative agencies; and in other noncommercial matters. 
69. It is possible, of course, that causation runs the other way: that is, from the changing 
type of state supreme court cases to structural change in the court system. As criminal appeals 
increased on some Type II court dockets in the 1960s, the demand for intermediate appellate 
courts and case-selecting discretion increased. Nevertheless, the four courts which fell within 
Type III for most or all of the 1940-1970 period (California, New Jersey, Tennessee, West 
Virginia) had intermediate appellate courts or discretion before the nationwide upsurge in 
criminal cases. The tendency of these supreme courts to expand the percentage of criminal-
and public-law cases faster than average suggests that supreme court discretion actually af-
fected the types of cases on which those courts concentrated. 
70. As we suggested earlier, a state's social, economic, and political characteristics-in ad-
dition to its court structure-undoubtedly affect the mix of cases selected by its supreme court. 
But the relationships are complicated, and judicial culture and attitudes also play a part. See 
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B. Opinion Style 
We might expect that courts with high discretion and small 
caseloads would be able to devote more time to their decisions and, 
hence, to write longer opinions, cite more cases, and make more use 
of law review articles (an indication, perhaps, of more sophisticated 
scholarship). The opinions of such courts might be well-regarded, 
and therefore frequently cited, by other courts. 
Table 5 provides some evidence for these suggested relationships. 
With the exception of Tennessee, the high-discretion courts tended 
to write longer opinions than their busier, heavy-caseload counter-
parts and low-caseload supreme courts in small states. California's 
court wrote the longest opinions of the sixte~n. But again, differ-
ences within groups are greater than those among groups.71 
Table 5 also shows that, on the average, the high-discretion 
courts cited law review articles more often than Type I or II courts. 
However, these averages may be a bit misleading. Two Type III 
courts, California and New Jersey, cited law review articles in over 
15% of their opinions, more than double the sixteen-state mean, 
while two other states with high-discretion courts, West Virginia and 
Tennessee, cited law reviews less often than the average. Perhaps 
more striking than the comparisons is the paucity of law review cita-
tions by any supreme court. For good or for ill, however, the rate is 
Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman, & Wheeler, note 2 supra. Consequently, attempts to show di-
rect relationships between social, economic, and political variables, on one hand, and supreme 
court agenda on the other, have produced inconclusive results for the most part. See Atkins & 
Glick, Environmental and Structural Variables as Determinants of Issues in State Courts of Last 
Resort, 20 AM. J. POL. Sci. 97 (1976) (using regression analysis, with state supreme court 
opinions for 1966-1967 as the dependent variable). 
71. A closer look at some of the "deviant cases," however, confirms the relationship be-
tween caseload control and page length. The Nevada Supreme Court (Type I) and the Oregon 
Supreme Court (Type II) wrote opinions that were considerably longer, on the average, than 
the mean for their respective groups, taking the whole 1940-1970 period, but that seems to 
result, at least in part, from their low caseloads during the first part of the period. In the 1945-
1955 period, the Nevada Supreme Court averaged a mere 36 opinions a year, and the Oregon 
Supreme Court averaged 115. The opinions of both courts in those years were extraordinarily 
long: Nevada averaged 9 pages, and Oregon 8.8. In 1960-1970, however, when the Nevada 
Supreme Court averaged a more substantial 131 opinions a year and the Oregon court surged 
to an average of 274, the average opinion length dropped to 4.6 pages for Nevada and 4.2 for 
Oregon, far shorter than the 16-state mean and lower than the average for their "types." Thus, 
their high average page length for the 1940-1970 period (6.8 pages) reflects the long opinions of 
the earlier, low-caseload period. 
In many ways, these interstate differences are less striking than the constant inflation of 
opinions during the century. Only Tennessee now produces shorter opinions than it did in the 
early decades of the century. 
On opinion length and its relationship to styles of judicial reasoning, see Goutal, Character-
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growing.72 
Citations to case law were, of course, far more universal. Table 5 
shows the tendency of supreme courts between 1940 and 1970 to cite 
earlier cases extensively. We drew an arbitrary line between cases 
that cited more than eight other cases and those that cited eight or 
fewer. The table shows the percentage of state supreme court cases 
which cited more than eight cases. California led here too-73% of 
its opinions cited more than eight prior cases. Of the three other 
Type III states, New Jersey and West Virginia were also well above 
average; only Tennessee lagged. Type II courts averaged considera-
bly fewer, and Type I courts fewer still, although Alabama and 
Idaho scored very high. There was some relationship, therefore, be-
tween habits of frequent citation and court type, but it was not 
strong.73 
Finally, Table 5 indicates how many times, on the average, out-
of-state courts cited each state supreme court's published cases dur-
ing the 1940-1970 period. It thus provides a rough measure of the 
relative influence of courts. Opinions by Type III courts were cited 
more often, but the differences are rather small. California and New 
Jersey led; the average California Supreme Court case was cited four 
times, the average New Jersey case three times. The only other state 
that averaged more than two citations per case was Illinois. Individ-
ual differences, however, seem stronger than differences by type of 
state. For example, other courts treated opinions from Tennessee 
and West Virginia with relative indifference, even though both were 
Type III courts. 
72. Law reviews themselves vary tremendously in impact and prestige. See Maru, Measur-
ing the Impact of Legal Periodicals, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 227. 
Citations in California have been studied by John Henry Merryman, whose results are 
reported in Merryman, The Authority of Authority: 1Yltat the California Supreme Court Cited in 
1950, 6 STAN. L. REv. 613 (1954), and in Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empiri-
cal Study of the Citation Practice of the Cal!fornia Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977). 
73. Looking closely at citations on a state-by-state basis, we found that the introduction of 
an intermediate appellate court and of supreme court case-selecting discretion consistently and 
substantially increased the number of case citations in supreme court opinions. In New Jersey, 
an extreme instance, the rate of citation in 1950-1970 was three times what it was in 1925-1945. 
In North Carolina, the 1970 citation rate was roughly double the 1960 and 1965 rate. Similar 
increases occurred in Kansas, Alabama and California when they instituted intermediate ap-
pellate courts in 1895, 1911 and 1904, respectively; the rate then declined in Kansas after the 
intermediate appellate courts were abolished in 1901. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court's case citation rate increased after a limited intermediate 
appellate court was established in 1895, and then again in 1907 after the court was expanded, 
but it declined after jurisdictional revisions in the 1920s granted appeals from the intermediate 
appellate court as of right in a broad class of public-law cases and workmen's compensation 
matters. 



















W.Va. ' 59.S 
mean 46.7 
Grand Mean 35.S 
F Value 4.66 
FSig. .030 
TABLE 6 
CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES: OUTCOMES, 1940-1970 
Cases Reversed Non•unanimous Decisions 
Percent Change Percent Change 
Rank Order from 1905-1935 Percent Rank Order from 1905-1935 
9 0.2 5.6 13 4.0 
15 - 9.4 6.4 II - 9.5 
II - S.6 22.3 4 6.3 
14 -10.4 4.8 14 3.2 
6 - 2.9 16.8 8 - 3.0 
11.0 - S.6 11.2 10.0 0.2 
2 12.0 17.7 7 5,7 
8 9.6 18.2 6 10.2 
10 -13.3 6.4 II -6.3 
12 - 6.9 2.4 15 -4.0 
16 - 8.7 IS.I 9 7.2 
7 IS.S 9.S to 0.0 
13 -to.I 28.6 3 20.7 
9.3 - 0.3 14.0 8.7 4.8 
3 to.I 32.6 2 23.9 
s 4.8 35.4 l 10.4 
4 - 1.9 2.4 IS 0.0 
I 6.2 20.8 s 7.3 
3.25 4.8 22.8 S.15 10.4 
- - 0.7 15.3 - 4.8 
- 1.53 I.SI - 1.54 - .252 .257 - .252 
Declarations of 
Unconstitutionality in Cases 
with Constitutional Issues 
Percent Change 
Percent Rank Order from 1905-1935 
14.3 II 14.3 
20.0 7 -17.5 
0.0 15 - 6.7 
16.7 9 -33.3 
16.7 9 16.7 
13.S 12.2 - S.3 
10.0 14 10.0 
0.0 IS -20.0 
19.1 8 -14.3 
14.3 II 3.2 
II.I 13 II.I 
30.8 3 2.2 
36.8 l 26.8 
17.4 9.3 2.7 
30.0 4 9.2 
30.0 4 5.0 
28.6 6 13.6 
32.0 2 19.S 
30.1 4.0 11.8 
19.4 - 2.5 
3.53 - 1.24 
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C. Case Results 
Are the actual results of cases affected when supreme courts con-
trol their caseload? We looked at three measures of case results: the 
percentage of reversals by a supreme court; the percentage of non-
unanimous supreme court decisions (the dissent rate); and the per-
centage of cases declaring laws, decisions, or practices unconstitu-
tional, among cases that raise such issues. Table 6 displays the 
results of these three measures. 
The three measures, especially the reversal rates, indicate that 
caseload control does make a difference. From the first third to the 
second third of the twentieth century, the reversal rate for Type I 
courts declined, while the reversal rate for Type III courts increased. 
From 1940 to 1970, Type I courts reversed only one-third of all the 
cases they reviewed. Type III courts reversed nearly half. Individ-
ual states ranged from the low reversal rate of 24.6% in Kansas to the 
high 59.5% of West Virginia. Except for North Carolina, however, 
the reversal rate was higher in each of the Type III jurisdictions than 
in any of the courts that had less discretion to winnow out unmer-
itorious appeals. Of course, case-selecting discretion does not neces-
sarily<mean that supreme courts only take cases they intend to 
reverse. After all, most Type III courts reversed fewer than half of 
their cases.74 
The dissent rates were not so uniform. Dissent has always been 
uncommon in Tennessee,75 but the other three Type III courts, West 
Virginia, California and New Jersey (all of which indeed had greater 
discretion than Tennessee), had higher dissent rates than the aver-
ages for Type I and Type II courts. This suggests either that these 
74. For comparable data on reversal rates, see Canon & Jaros, State Supreme 
Courts-Some Comparative Data, 42 ST. GoVT. 260 (1969) (a study of a sample of decisions 
from all 50 state supreme courts, 1961-1967). To compute reversal rates, we had to decide 
which cases to include in the study and how to code decisions that reverse lower court deci-
sions on some issues, but affirm on others. In addition to excluding cases decided with only 
very brief memorandum opinions, see note 4 supra and accompanying text, we coded' as a 
reversal: 
(1) any supreme court decision resulting in a substantial benefit to the appellant (com-
pared to his position after the lower court decision), even if the decision produced, for exam-
ple, a new trial rather than a final judgment in his favor; 
(2) any supreme court victory for the plaintiff when petitions for habeas corpus or man-
damus, formally original actions in the supreme court, in essence sought review of a lower 
court's decision (which very often was the case). 
75. Some courts seem to discourage dissent consistently. More than 95% of the Alabama, 
Maine, Rhode Island, and Tennessee opinions were unanimous throughout the century of this 
study. 
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courts chose controversial cases or that they had the time and incli-
nation to emphasize the controversial issues in their cases. Yet here 
too, differences among states are more striking than differences 
among categories. Idaho, for example, had an unexpectedly high 
rate of dissent (22%), although Nevada, a neighbor with a rapidly 
increasing caseload, was becoming increasingly unanimous. The 
Michigan Supreme Court, noted for its contentiousness,76 produced 
many dissents (28.6%) despite its heavy caseload for most of the 
1940-1970 period. In California and New Jersey, which perhaps rep-
resent the wave of the future, fully a third of the cases generated 
dissents.77 
We noted that the Type III courts more often heard cases that 
raised constitutional issues. Table 6 shows that they were also more 
likely to declare a law or practice unconstitutional. Holding the 
number of constitutional issues constant, the small population states 
of Type I became on the whole less likely in the 1940-1970 period to 
declare an act or practice unconstitutional; on the average, they did 
so in only 13.5% of their cases. In Type III states, allegations of un-
constitutionality were sustained about three times out of ten (30.1%), 
compared to an average of 17.4% for the busier, low-discretion 
courts of Type II (although Michigan and Minnesota also scored 
high in this measure).78 
Finally, the Type III courts were more likely, on the average, to 
decide in favor of defendants in criminal appeals, the most rapidly 
increasing and changing area of law during the last two decades of 
our research period.79 The Type III courts may or may not have 
16. See Ulmer, The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. Pun. L. 
352 (1962). 
77. After becoming a low-volume court with high discretion in 1967, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court began to write longer opinions, and its dissent and reversal rates went up. 
Groot, supra note 60, at 563-64. See also Canon & Jaros, External Variables, Institutional 
Structure and .Dissent on State Supreme Courts, 3 POLITY 175 (1970); Jaros & Canon, .Dissent 
on State Supreme Courts: The .Differential Sign!ficance of Characteristics of Judges, 15 Mm-
WEST J. POL. Sci. 332 (1971). 
For data on dissent rates (as opposed to our figures on non-unanimous opinions, including 
both dissents and separate concurring opinions), see Canon & Jaros, supra note 74, and C. 
Ducat & V. Flango, Leadership in State Supreme Courts: Roles of the Chief Justice (1976) 
(Sage Professional Paper) (based on a survey of all decisions by 14 state supreme courts from 
1951 to 1971). Our state-by-state data, when recalculated for dissent rates alone in the Canon 
& Jaros and the C. Ducat & V. Flango survey periods, closely resemble their findings. 
78. Table 6 is based on the frequency of supreme court rulings of unconstitutionality. 
Courts without case-selecting discretion may be forced more often to hear weak or farfetched 
constitutional claims, and therefore may declare laws or acts unconstitutional less frequently, 
but in serious cases they may have just as great or greater an inclination to overturn statutes or 
practices as courts with more discretion. 
79. Results for criminal appeals include habeas corpus petitions heard by state supreme 
courts. 
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been more sympathetic to the underdog; ~he results may simply re-
flect their greater capacity to screen claims of defendants that were 
legally more tenuous. (The Michigan Supreme Court, otherwise a 
Type II court for most of the 1940-1970 period, did have discretion 
to accept or reject criminal appeals and had the strongest pro-de-
fendant record.)8° Clearly, however, the courts with case-selecting 
discretion had a greater opportunity to use their time and energy to 
articulate new law at the frontiers of criminal procedure, rather than 
dealing with routine criminal matters routinely. 
On balance, our rough indicators suggest that measurable 
changes in the subject and style of judicial opinions, and in results of 
decisions, coincide with increased discretion to select cases, with 
court reorganization, and with the changes in judges' sense of their 
own function that are likely to accompany reorganization. Perhaps 
the changes in subject, style, and result are not as great as some 
would expect, and obviously court organization is not the only factor 
influencing a supreme court's performance. But from 1940 to 1970, 
the high-discretion courts tended to move more rapidly into new 
areas of law and to accept more constitutional cases. Their higher 
rate of dissenting and separate concurring opinions suggests that 
their cases were more often controversial or that the judges were 
more likely to treat them as such. They reversed lower-court deci-
sions more often, and they wrote longer opinions which cited cases 
and law reviews more often. 
These rough measures do not necessarily mean that Type III 
courts write better opinions, of course.81 Nor can we say that the 
courts with low discretion do not invest substantial effort and debate 
in those cases they regard as important.82 At most we can say, rather 
80. On the other hand, Rhode Island's supreme court, which had no formal case-selecting 
discretion, had the second highest rate of pro-defendant decisions in criminal cases. This and 
the widely varying results in the other low-discretion courts emphasize the obvious importance 
of other factors-presumably legal doctrine and judicial attitudes-in determining results, re-
gardless of court structure. 
81. We would agree in part with one analyst of state supreme court structure who said, 
''The only meaningful measure to which this third branch of government can be subjected is 
an analysis of its decisions. Trying to judge the court by other standards is a bit like attempt-
ing to describe the quality of a chocolate cake by giving the dimensions of its bakery box." 
Smith, supra note 58, at 97. We would add, however, that our goal here is not to describe the 
quality of the cake, but the changing organization and output of the bakery-which does affect 
its capacity to produce good cake. 
82. In fact, ifwe examine only the most important opinions issued by lower-discretion state 
supreme courts (the 25% that received the most subsequent citations by other courts, 1940-
1970), we find that they are much closer to the average Type III court opinion in length and in 
number of cases cited. But they are quite a bit shorter and have fewer citations than the most 
important Type III state supreme court opinions. Moreover, even the most important (most 
frequently cited) cases in Type I and Type II courts, 1940-1970, had a significantly lower rever-
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timidly, that the reduction of caseload in courts with high discretion 
may increase our chances of getting better judicial opinions. It 
would be bold to carry the matter much further. A century ago, the 
United States Supreme Court heard many quite ordinary 
cases-appeals from will contests or contract cases in the District of 
Columbia and diversity cases of all sorts-along with more dramatic 
fare. Those ordinary cases rarely reach the Supreme Court today, 
but can we confidently say that the Court's workmanship has there-
fore drastically improved? We think not. But we can say that to-
day's Court cuts farther into the fabric of society and that its power 
and reach have grown tremendously. So, too, of state supreme 
courts with discretion, in the smaller realms of their states. 
In sum, the findings set out in the tables, taken together, suggest 
that discretion to select cases affects the behavior of state supreme 
courts. More complex statistical analysis of our data, as set forth in 
the Appendix, 83 confirms the results. The multivariate analysis re-
fines the major findings and suggests the strengths and weaknesses of 
our results in more detail, but it yields no substantial differences in 
interpretation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the late nineteenth century, American state supreme courts 
were mainly reactive bodies. By and large, litigants chose the cases 
and determined the issues. The judicial system was democratic in 
theory; the states' highest courts were open to everyone, regardless of 
wealth or political influence, whether the claim represented a wide-
spread issue, or was peculiar to a single suitor. As state populations 
grew, accessibility produced enormous caseloads for the high courts. 
Supreme courts in the larger states sometimes issued over 400 or 
sal rate, dissent rate, and rate of declaration of unconstitutionality than even the average Type 
III court cases. 
83. In brief, that analysis discloses that the "area of law" or "type of case" measures shown 
in Table 4 form a coherent multivariate "public-private law" dimension from 1905 to 1970. 
The opinion-style and citation measures shown in Table 5 form a coherent single dimension 
from 1940 to 1970; that is, states high on one measure in this period tend to be high on the 
others as well. The outcome measures in Table 6, however, do not seem to reflect a common 
underlying dimension. State supreme court caseload control is only weakly related to a con-
centration on public-law issues in the 1960-1970 period; that relationship is not statistically 
significant at the .05 level, perhaps because of the small number of states in the sample. 
Caseload control has a fairly strong relationship to opinion style and density of citations (a 
borderline significance at the .08 level) and to reversal rates (significant at the .002 level). 
Since there is also a positive relationship between opinion style and reversal rate, they can be 
combined into a single dimension whose overall relationship to caseload control is significant 
at the .02 level. However, the strength of the relationships may be either overstated or (more 
probably) understated due to the difficulty of accurately measuring "caseload control" with a 
three-group typology of states. 
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even 500 opinions a year. Compared to courts with smaller 
caseloads, their opinions were shorter and (perhaps) more perfunc-
tory. The courts were criticized for delays and backlogs, for the 
mechanical quality of their opinions, and for their inattention to a 
changing society. Some of these complaints were unfair or were un-
related to judicial structure, but they helped spur a movement for 
structural reform. 
By 1970, all the large and most of the not-so-large states had 
achieved some measure of reform, though changes had generally oc-
curred slowly and painfully. Political opposition and traditional no-
tions of the judicial function impeded reform. Finally, most of the 
medium-sized and large states created intermediate appellate courts 
to absorb much of the supreme court caseload; these states also gave 
their courts discretion to choose the appeals they wanted to hear. 
The courts could therefore concentrate on appeals that they thought 
meritorious or that raised important issues of policy or principle. 
Their job was no longer defined primarily as one of correcting lower-
court errors. They had larger professional staffs and, in many in-
stances, considerable power to issue rules of procedure. 
These changes affected the daily work of the courts. Between 
1940 and 1970, the supreme courts with high discretion wrote fewer 
opinions than the other courts. Their opinions tended to be longer 
and to cite more cases. They also reversed lower court decisions 
more often. Their opinions contained more dissents and concur-
rences. These courts tended to decide more constitutional issues; 
and they invalidated statutes or procedures more often, on the aver-
age, than the low-discretion courts. They spent somewhat less time 
with commercial and real estate cases (the traditional staples of state 
supreme court business), and more time on criminal- and public-law 
cases. And in criminal cases, they more frequently reversed the 
lower courts. Some of these differences were surprisingly slight, and 
not all high-discretion courts behaved alike. Nevertheless, our rough 
indicators point in the same direction: changes in court organization 
seemed to make some difference in the agendas, opinion styles, and 
decisions of the state supreme courts. 
Intermediate appellate courts and case-selecting discretion do 
not, to be sure, solve the workload problem for state supreme courts. 
The number of cases decided with full opinions seems manageable, 
but supreme court judges and their clerks must somehow find time to 
screen the petitions for review that flood the courts. In California, 
for example, petitions to the supreme court for review of lower ap-
pellate court decisions climbed from 803 in the 1961-1962 term to 
1000 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:961 
2,417 in 1971-1972; total case filings, including original actions, were 
3,238.84 Some observers think that the job of screening petitions and 
the methods used to speed up that job have hurt the quality of the 
court's work.85 In a way, then, the largest states may have reached a 
fourth stage of high discretion, low caseload, but high workload. In 
those states, the court must devise more efficient case-selection tech-
niques. 86 The question is no longer whether this screening should be 
done, but how and by whom. By the judges themselves? By a pro-
fessional staff? Or by some combination? And with what proce-
dures? 
Most states have accepted the idea that a supreme court should 
concentrate primarily on the most important cases, on articulating 
and elaborating principles of law. Some observers applaud this de-
velopment and call it progress. Our society benefits, they say, when 
the states' highest courts ar~ aware of issues, policies, and conse-
quences and are responsive to changing circumstances and values. 
Others find the trend disturbing. The courts, they say, are ill-
equipped to act as "roving commissions" in solving social 
problems."87 Because there are inevitable limits on the information 
available to supreme courts, and because of the piecemeal, case-by-
case manner in which they act, it is dangerous, the critics charge, to 
let courts seek out big issues and change the law in big steps. 88 Thus, 
there are those who fear grave miscalculation and social disruption if 
a handful of judges, unrestrained by the ordinary electoral process, 
or the need to balance a budget, are encouraged to concentrate on 
important cases with incredible social impact. 
The debate goes on, perhaps endlessly. Are judges capable of 
84. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, PART II: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRA· 
TNE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA COURTS 173 (1973). See Clark, American Supreme Court 
Caseloads: A Preliminary Inquiry, Law in the U.S.A. in the Bicentennial Era, 26 (Supp.) AM, J, 
CoMP. L. 217, 218 (1978); Note, A Statistical Analysis of the Workload of the Ca/!fornia 
Supreme Court, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 532 (1977). 
85. See Johnson, Foreword· The Accidental Decision and How It Happens, 65 CALIF. L. 
REv. 231 (1977). On the decline of collegial discussion, see Smith, The Appellate Decisional 
Coeference, 28 ARK. L. REv. 425 (1975). 
86. See generally P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 
(1976); Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L. REV, 255 
(1975). See also Black, The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE L.J. 883 
(1974); J. Goldman, The Appellate Settlement Conference: An Effective Procedural Reform? 
(1977) (paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, annual meeting). 
87. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 134 (1970). 
88. See D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977). See also Glazer, To-
wards an Imperial Judiciary?, THE PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1975, at 104, noting that even the 
"conservative" Burger Court, supposedly packed with "strict constructionists" by Richard 
Nixon, has continued to "make new law'' quite boldly in several areas. 
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intelligent policy-making and innovation?89 Should they take the in-
itiative in problems of policy and justice, when legislatures, police 
departments, and bureaucracies are deadlocked or inert? No 
amount of data will resolve that question; Our study has revealed 
patterns of supreme court evolution toward smaller numbers of 
opinions and greater case-selecting discretion. State supreme courts 
can, and indeed are now designed to, concentrate on "key" cases. 
This has weakened some traditional institutional restraints on activ-
ism. For these, as well as other reasons, the courts are unlikely to 
tum back to a less activist role. 
89. For a more affirmative view, see Chayes, The Role ef the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976). See also Carter, When Courts Should Make Policy: 
An Institutional Approach, in PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 141 (J. Gardiner ed. 1977). 
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MULTIVARIATE APPENDIX 
Do the consequence variables (area of law, opinion style, and 
case results) form common multivariate factors? If so, how are these 
factors related to state supreme court discretion? Does caseload-con-
trol affect all factors uniformly or some factors more than others? To 
answer these questions, we will factor-analyze the consequence vari-
ables and then examine mean differences on the resulting factor 
scores (the dependent variables) across the three state supreme court 
discretion groups (the independent variable). 
Table A presents a two-factor solution for all consequence vari-
ables in the periods 1905-1935 and 1940-1970.AI The major vari-
ables-areas of law, opinion style, and case results-tend to follow 
different reliability patterns. Law variables form a stable cluster 
from 1905 to 1970. Some states emphasize business and tort issues. 
Other states emphasize criminal- and public-law issues. But the state 
rankings on these issues appear constant from 1905 to 1970. Opinion 
variables, on the other hand, coincide for 1940-1970, but not for 
1905-1935. Measures of opinion style (page length of the majority 
opinion, judicial citations per page, and law review citations) and its 
reputation or use among other courts (Shephard's citations) are posi-
tively loaded for 1940-1970, but weakly loaded before 1940. Finally, 
outcome variables do not provide a single unified factor either 
within or across time periods. The dissent variable has a positive 
loading for both 1905-1935 and 1940-1970, but neither reversals nor 
declarations of unconstitutionality are strongly tied across time or to 
other outcome variables. Overall, these results suggest diverse rela-
tionships: law variables appear to tap a common public-private di-
mension in both time periods, opinion-style variables only seem to 
produce a single dimension in the last period and outcome variables 
probably do not produce a unitary dimension in either time period. 
Since the consequence variables have different internal reliabili-
ties over time, it is difficult (and not very meaningful) to examine 
factor score means for the entire period 1905-1970, but we can test 
these relations for a limited time period. We have chosen the period 
1960 to 1970 because it is the first time period to break the general 
relation between population pressures and opinion caseloads. This 
period also shows interesting_ growth disparities between states with 
increasing and decreasing caseloads (a phenomenon obscured by the 
nationwide caseload decline between 1930 and 1945). 
Al. Multiple factors, up to five with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, can be extracted from 
these variables. But a two-factor solution allows a concise and easily interpretable summary. 
The correlations in this factor analysis are based on the state percentages for each variable 
rather than the cases in the original sample. 
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TABLE A 
SUMMARY OF TEMPORAL RELATIONS, 1905-1970 
Variables 









Stxle and Citations 
Page Length 
Page Length 
Cites Per Page 
Cites Per Page 
Shephard's Cites 
Shephard's Cites 
Law Review Cites 














































































































Table B reports factor loadings for the consequence variables, 
1960-1970. The results follow the 1940 to 1970 patterns in Table A. 
Law areas form a single public-private dimension. Page length and 
the citation variables form a single depth and intensity of research 
dimension. No evidence exists, however, of a single outcome dimen-
sion (reversals load .48 on the opinion research factor and dissents 
load .81 on the residual third factor, but no combination of outcome 
variables has a loading of .40 on a common factor). Since reversals 
have a borderline .48 loading on the opinion research factor, we will 
compare the opinion factor, with and without reversals, in the factor 
score analysis. 
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TABLE B 
FACTOR LOADINGS FOR CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES, 1960-1970 
Variables 





Style and Citations 
Page Length 
Cites Per Page 
Shephard's Cites 









I II III 
.814 -.264 -.162 
.515 -.706 .103 
-.522 .463 .498 
-.461 .782 -.383 
.622 .141 .430 
.560 .342 .282 
.849 .243 .025 
.597 .459 .127 
.441 .246 .079 
.488 .575 -.473 
.363 .089 -.162 
4.092 2.431 1.294 
37.2 22.1 11.8 
Varimax RotatedA2 
Loadings 
I II III 
.419 .747 .195 
.037 .864 -.160 
.055 -.804 -.291 
-.209 -.747 .608 
.744 .151 -.121 
.708 .008 .090 
.755 .331 .319 
.708 -.0ll .287 
.476 .065 .175 
.372 .0ll .809 














* R2 initial diagonal elements with iteration (SPSS method PA2) and minimum eigenvalues= 
1.0. 
Table C presents the factor score means, 1960-1970, across the 
three-state supreme court discretion groups. The factor score means 
tell approximately the same story as the percentage differences in 
Tables 4 to 6. While state supreme court discretion has a weak and 
insignificant relation to the public-private law dimension (a signifi-
cance level of .17), it has a borderline relation to the opinion factor 
(a significance level of .08) and a fairly strong relation to the reversal 
variable (a significance level of .002). If the opinion factor and the 
reversal variable are combined into a single dimension (as suggested 
by Factor I in Table B), the overall relation to state supreme court 
discretion remains statistically significant at the .02 level. 
Based on these results, it seems likely that a case-screening capac-
ity affects (a) a court's tendency to reverse lower-court decisions; and 
(b) the quantity, if not the quality, of its investments in opinion re-
search and drafting. But a state supreme court's case-screening ca-
pacity does not unambiguously affect the relative distribution of 
public- and private-law issues before the court. 
A2. For a discussion of reliability estimates using highest loading factor sales, see Armor, 
Theta Reliability and Factor Scaling, in SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY, 1973-1974, at 33-49 
, (H. Costner ed.). 
TABLE C 
FACTOR SCORE AND COMPONENT 2 SCORE MEANS: CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES, 1960-1970 
Public Versus Private Law Opinion Style and Reputation Outcomes 
Crime, Propcny, Private. Judicial Shephard's Law Review Opinion 
States Constitution Public Business Tons Law Factor Page Length Cites Cites Cites Factor Reversals Dissents 
Low Population 
Low Discretion -0,2 0.3 -0.1 -0,3 0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -1.6 -0.5 -0,2 
High Population 
Mixed Discretion -0.3 -0.3 0.4 0.5 -1.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0,0 -0,5 -0.4 -0,1 
High Population 
High Discretion 0.8 0.3 -0.6 -0.6 2.3 0,8 0.7 0.9 0.6 3.0 1.3 0.4 
Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F Value 2.1 0.7 1.5 2.1 2.0 2.2 1.4 2.7 I.I 3.0 10.6 0.4 
F Sig. .167 .533 .265 .160 .172 .155 ,278 .l02 .356 .083 .002 .709 
Unconstitu• 
tional 
Declarations 
-0.5 
0,1 
0.5 
0.0 
0.9 
.414 
Opinion 
Factor Plus 
Reversals 
-2.1 
-1.0 
4.3 
0.0 
5.67 
.017 
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